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I. INTRODUCTION
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing; ’Twas
mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.1
Financial transaction information2 is very revealing. By sifting
through your credit and debit card transactions, your checks,3 your ATM
archives, your credit application data, your stock portfolios, and your
insurance records, financial institutions can discern, among other things,
where you live; where you work; whether you own or rent your home;
your age; what diseases you have; your height and weight; whether you
take prescription medicine; your income to debt ratio; what products or
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
2. No formal definition of the term “transaction data” exists, but as used herein, it
refers to any personal information about a consumer that is collected by a commercial
enterprise in the conducting of any business transaction with the consumer. In the
context of financial services, the transaction data will largely take the form of credit card
transactions, check records and credit application data. However, the data can also take
the form of data collected in the financial institution’s dealings with the consumer (that
is, a teller’s conversation with the customer at a bank) as well as data that may be
purchased by a financial institution from various information databases. For this reason,
financial transaction data may include virtually every recorded fact about individual
consumers and their behavior.
3. See Cal. Banker’s Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J.
dissenting) (“In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining
them . . . [one] get[s] to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social
connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines he
reads, and so on ad infinitum.”).
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services you buy; what charities, political causes, or religious organizations
you contribute to; your ethnic identity; your marital status; whether you
have children; where, with whom, and when you travel; how you spend
your leisure time; whether there has been a recent birth or death in your
family; whether you have unusual or dangerous hobbies; and even
whether you participate in certain felonious activities.4 Financial
institutions collect, process, manipulate, barter, trade, and merge this
transaction data with data from other sources, public and private,5 to
produce a robust “profile”6 representing the economic, demographic,
psychographic,7 and social identity of each customer. This profile
provides financial institutions and their affiliates and marketing partners
with a detailed information picture of a consumer’s personality,8
4. For example, automatic teller machine (ATM) records can reveal which bank
customers are procuring meretricious services. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION:
THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 72 (2000). Garfinkel refers to ATM
archives as “hot files.” Id.
5. For a description of the current scope of this type of activity, see FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLIC WORKSHOP: THE INFORMATION
MARKETPLACE: MERGING AND EXCHANGING CONSUMER DATA (2001), available at
http:www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infomktplace/transcript.htm [hereinafter FTC INFO
MARKETPLACE] (remarks of Lynn Wunderman).
6. The term “profile” has no formal definition, although it represents the end
result of the processing of data by means of several technologies for data management
discussed in Part II of this Comment, including data mining, Knowledge Discovery in
Databases (KDD), data modeling, and the use of artificial intelligence to discover
unknown patterns and new rules from large databases. One author has defined it as, “the
gathering, assembling, and collating of data about individuals in databases which can be
used to identify, segregate, categorize and generally make decisions about individuals
known to the decisionmaker only through their computerized profile.” Karl D. Belgum,
Who Leads at Half-Time? Three Conflicting Visions of Internet Privacy Policy, 6 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 8 (1999), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i1/belgum.html; see also
PIETER ADRIAANS & DOLF ZANTINGE, DATA MINING v-vii (1996); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ &
JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 311–14 (1996). By some accounts, profiles
exist on almost every household in the United States. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE,
supra note 5 (remarks of Lynn Wunderman). The accuracy of the data profile is, in large
part, a function of the sheer magnitude of the data collected in financial transactions. See
STAN RAPP & CHUCK MARTIN, MAX-E-MARKETING IN THE NET FUTURE 17 (2001). One
large bank apparently had collected enough personally-identifiable consumer
information to create a printout that reached “from the earth to the moon and back.” Id.
7. See infra note 40.
8. Several related terms can be used to define the concept of self. The word
“personality” focuses on the multitude of particulars which identify an individual to the
world or, “the complex of characteristics that distinguishes an individual . . . or group;
[especially] the totality of an individual’s behavioral and emotional characteristics.”
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 878 (1989). The word “persona” is a
term of art connoting the “symbols or indicia which identify a unique human being . . .
includ[ing] the name, likeness, voice, signature, character and other distinctive indicia by
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including who that consumer is, what that consumer thinks, and what
that consumer is apt to do next.
Profiling is often spoken of with reference to the valuable social and
economic benefits it will produce by enabling more efficient marketing
and better customer service.9 Although surveys indicate that consumers
are concerned about their transaction privacy,10 both industry
spokespersons11 and government regulators12 have stressed that the
which a specific person is identified by other persons.” JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM
PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 265–66 (Info. Law
Series No. 5, 1996).
9. Microsoft Corporation founder, Bill Gates, stressed the efficiency of a world
where every move of an individual is tracked by authenticating technology and where
the resulting personally-identifiable information on all consumers will be readily
accessible and tradable by corporate entities. See BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 267–74
(1995). Gates referred to this phenomenon as the “documented life.” Id. at 268. He
described as “backward looking” those who suggest that this technology may degrade
the human spirit. Id. at 274. Microsoft Corporation markets a product that makes this
profiled world possible. See Alec Klein, Planting the Seeds; With Its ‘.Net’ Transition
from the Desktop to the Web, Microsoft Could Reap New Dominance—and Scrutiny,
WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at H1. Michael Saylor, founder and CEO of MicroStrategy,
Inc. is a prominent and vocal proponent of the “infinitely more intelligent, efficient and
caring society” that useful sliced and diced personal information can provide. See
Michael Saylor, The Missing Issue, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2000, at A17; see also Jean
Schauer, An Executive Interview: MicroStrategy, DM REVIEW, Feb. 2001, at
http://www.dmreview.com/master.cfm. But see GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 5:
Many people today say that in order to enjoy the benefits of modern
society, we must necessarily relinquish some degree of privacy. . . .
I think this tradeoff is both unnecessary and wrong. It reminds me of
another crisis our society faced back in the 1950s and 1960s—the
environmental crisis. . . . Poison was progress: anybody who argued otherwise
simply didn’t understand the facts.
For remarks highlighting the potential economic benefits of profiling, see DON PEPPERS
& MARTHA ROGERS, THE ONE TO ONE FUTURE 5–6 (1993) (indicating that the “1:1
future” will have a tremendous impact on personal privacy, but will also, “create an
entrepreneurial froth of opportunities”); see also FRED H. CATE, PERSONAL INFORMATION
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 4 (Financial Services Coordinating Council 2000) (quoting
Walter F. Kitchenman of the Tower Group when referring to the reporting of personal
information about consumers as the “secret ingredient of the U.S. economy’s
resilience”).
10. Ninety-five percent of people questioned would be either not very comfortable
or not at all comfortable with the creation of a profile that contained personallyidentifiable information such as income and credit data. Business Week/Harris Poll: A
Growing Threat, BUS. WK., March 20, 2000, at 96. Twenty-three percent of people
questioned said that they believed that a bank had at some time violated their financial
privacy. Thomson Financial, Inc., A Crimp in Trust, FIN. SERVS. MARKETING, July 17,
2001, at 21, 2001 WL 13521307. Statistics show that almost half of consumers would
not agree to allow the profiling of their information even if they were told what would be
done with the information and were given the choice to opt-out of certain unapproved
uses. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, June 2000, at
16 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov./os/2000/06/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf
[hereinafter ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT].
11. The views of privacy consultant, Alan Westin, are frequently cited by industry.
Mr. Westin segments the populace into three categories of consumer: the “Privacy
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privacy of transaction data is best dealt with by industry self-regulation.
However, there are some indications that industry self-regulation may be
failing to protect consumer privacy, and therefore this approach is not
without its critics.13 In fact, a consumer’s barter of his or her
personality (embodied in personally-identifiable transaction data) to
corporate entities may best be described as a Faustian bargain.14 And
Fundamentalists,” the “Privacy Pragmatists,” and the “Privacy Unconcerned.” He
suggests that most consumers fall into the Privacy Pragmatists category, who value the
benefits to be obtained from businesses’ profiling activities over any potential loss of
privacy, and who therefore prefer industry self-regulation to any government legislative
action. The Privacy Fundamentalists (described as those who reject all claims of
business entitlement to consumer’s personal data) are characterized as highly distrustful
of government, business, and technology. See Opinion Surveys: What Consumers Have
to Say About Information Privacy, Hearing Before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001) (prepared testimony of Dr. Alan Westin, Professor
Emeritus, Columbia University; President, Privacy and American Business). Mr.
Westin’s funding is largely derived from the substantial consulting fees he receives from
multinational corporations that frequently lobby against privacy legislation. Glenn
Simpson, Consumer-Privacy Issue Turns a Retired Professor into a Hot Item, WALL ST.
J., June 25, 2001, at A20.
12. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has held several studies on data privacy,
most notably in the area of online profiling, but has repeatedly shied away from direct
legislative action, stressing the economic benefits of profiling and the need to protect the
nascent and economically vulnerable e-commerce industry. The FTC has indicated that
the “federal government currently has limited authority over the collection and
dissemination of personal data collected on-line” absent a patently deceptive failure to
comply with its stated information practices, and it lacks the authority to require a data
collector to adopt any information practice policies. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY
ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 40–41 (1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy3/priv-23a.pdf [hereinafter FTC 1998 REPORT]. The FTC has instead recommended
a policy of industry self-regulation. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 20–25.
See generally Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiatives, at http://www.ftc.gov/
privacy/index.html (last visited July 16, 2001).
13. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMMENTS REGARDING ELEMENTS OF
EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND QUESTIONS
RELATED TO ONLINE PRIVACY, reprinted in 2001 PRACTISING L. INST., SECOND ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW 695, 701–09; Peter Henderson, Privacy Issue Splits Tech
Camps: H-P Chief Presses for Web Legislation, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Aug. 21, 2001,
at C2. One privacy activist has indicated that the “notice and choice” self-regulatory
approach adopted by the FTC operates more like a disclaimer or a warning label than
any real privacy protection. See Hearing on Privacy in the Commercial World Before
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection Committee on Energy
and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (2001) (Testimony and Statement for the
Record of Marc Rotenberg), reprinted in SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW,
supra, at 305, 311. The FTC has only recently taken up the issue of offline privacy. See
infra note 35.
14. The tale of Faust’s sale of his soul to Mephistopheles has been described as a
morality play demonstrating the tensions between advancing technology and proper legal
restraints. See Manfred Lachs, Views from the Bench: Thoughts on Science, Technology
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indeed, because a consumer is often oblivious to the fact that such a
significant transaction has even taken place (either because the data
exchange does not legally require the consumer’s consent or because the
transfer is deemed permitted merely if the consumer fails to “opt-out”),15
an individual’s transfer of his or her personality to the private sector is
perhaps better described as a heist rather than as a bargained-for exchange.
Although almost every sector of the U.S. economy practices consumer
profiling,16 perhaps the most substantive challenge to consumer privacy is
found in the activities surrounding the use and disclosure of consumer
transaction data by the financial services industry.17 For that reason, this
Comment focuses exclusively on consumer profiling in the context of
the financial services sector, defined as banks, credit card issuers,
brokerages, and insurance companies.18
Necessary to any analysis of the possible impact on privacy posed by
and World Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 673, 697 (1992). Marlowe and Goethe penned the
most famous accounts of the Faustian legend. See CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, THE
COMPLETE PLAYS (J. B. Steane ed., 1969); JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST: A
TRAGEDY (Bayard Taylor, trans., 1887). See generally PHILIP MASON PALMER & ROBERT
PATTISON MORE, THE SOURCES OF THE FAUST TRADITION: FROM SIMON MAGUS TO
LESSING (1965). Posner’s contractual analysis of the Faust legend concludes that the
bargain was void against public policy. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE
110–14 (rev. and enl. ed. 1998). At least Faust negotiated a tangible reward of twentyfour years of worldly pursuits in exchange for his soul. In comparison, U.S. consumers
obtain a mere illusory promise that they will receive improved customer service and
perhaps fewer unwanted “Nike[™] ads” in exchange for their personality profiles. See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 154–55 (1999).
15. “Opt-out” is a term of art, meaning the setting of a default rule whereby a data
collector need not obtain express consent prior to using or disclosing a consumer’s
personal data. See infra note 22. Some suggest that there is a “misunderstanding gap”
between actual data collection, merger, and exchange practices versus the beliefs of
consumers concerning those practices. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5
(closing remarks of Joel Winston). A consumer often receives either no notice at all of
the sale of her information or her consent is implied by her failure to affirmatively optout of data sharing. See Beth Givens, Financial Privacy: The Shortcomings of the
Federal Financial Services Modernization Act, Presentation before the California Bar
Association (Sept. 15, 2000), at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fin_privacy.htm.
16. See generally FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5.
17. See Rachel Zimmerman & Glenn R. Simpson, Lobbyists Swarm to Stop Tough
Privacy Bills in States, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2000, at A16 (“For all the talk about the
Internet’s potential to become the ultimate surveillance tool, the most invasive datacollection practices now in use involve credit, banking, housing and health data that
consumers have given out for years.”).
18. But this category is not as limiting as it may seem at first glance. Consider that
General Motors Corporation offers home mortgages; Sears and Nordstrom issue
MasterCard and Visa products. See Michael Staten, Customer Relationship Management
as a Privacy Enhancer, at http://www.acxiom.com/ DisplayMain/0,1494,USA~en~990~
1244~0~0,00.html (May, 2001). This phenomenon is referred to as the “super industry”
where telecommunications, computers, financial services, and retailing industries
compete for the same customers, with the same products. Rashi Glazer, Marketing and
the Changing Information Environment: Implications for Strategy, Structure, and the
Marketing Mix, in USING MARKET KNOWLEDGE 127, 138 (Rohit Deshpandé ed., 2001).
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consumer profiling is an understanding of the technology itself. Thus,
Part II describes the profiling technology currently utilized by the
financial services industry and then discusses the technological advances
in profiling technology that are likely to be used by financial services in
the near future.
Next, Part III critically reviews some of the social and economic
effects that are likely to accompany the widespread use of profiling
technology in the financial services sector. As Part III demonstrates, the
practice of financial profiling produces important social and economic
impacts and has the potential to undermine the existing statutory
safeguards regarding the use and disclosure of sensitive personal
financial information.
Next, Part IV focuses on the current laws that address financial
privacy and illustrates that at present there are no real constitutional or
statutory protections in place for consumers who desire to prevent the
profiling of their financial information by the private sector. Furthermore,
Part IV reviews recently enacted financial privacy legislation and
suggests that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)19 not only fails to
address the issue of financial profiling but, by its creation of financial
holding companies,20 may even facilitate and encourage the greater use
of profiling by financial institutions.
Part V of this Comment therefore urges the courts to recognize a
common law right of privacy under which a consumer may control the
use and disclosure of his or her data profile. Although rumors of the
death of the right of privacy abound,21 this Comment proposes that such
pessimism is unfounded and that the inherently invasive nature of
profiling technology may introduce renewed vigor into the application of
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6810 (2000).
20. Id. A financial holding company is the creation of Title I of the GLBA, and
allows banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to align under a holding
company structure or as financial subsidiaries. 15 U.S.C. § 6809. See also CCH INC.,
FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION: GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, at 21
(Kenneth R. Benson et al. eds., 1999). Beth Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, referred to these financial holding companies as “financial
‘supermarkets’” with an “unprecedented ability to compile comprehensive data profiles
on their customers.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLIC
WORKSHOP: THE INFORMATION MARKETPLACE: MERGING AND EXCHANGING CONSUMER
DATA, (2001) (Comments of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse), at
http://www.ftc.gov.bcp/workshops/infomktplace/comments/givens.htm [hereinafter
GIVENS FTC COMMENTS].
21. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
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both the privacy intrusion on seclusion tort and the appropriation privacy
tort to information privacy issues.
Part V further demonstrates that the privacy tort may reformulate the
current opt-out paradigm22 by bringing into question the ability of
financial institutions to contract for unreasonably broad rights to use and
disclose consumers’ private information merely by publishing a privacy
policy. Part V then demonstrates that on the basis of a breach of the
common law right of privacy, a consumer may then utilize state
consumer protection statutes to vindicate this right.
The quiet erosion of privacy by consumer profiling may be an issue
that is ignored at our peril. Justice Brandeis wrote: “All law is a dead
letter without public opinion behind it. But law and public opinion
interact—and they are both capable of being made.”23 This Comment
therefore attempts to provide a glimpse of the potential socioeconomic
impacts of financial profiling in order to encourage public and judicial
opinion toward the recognition and enforcement of a consumer’s right to
refuse the appropriation of his or her data personality for commercial
purposes that exceed the scope of their reasonable expectation of
privacy.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY OF PROFILING
“You have zero privacy anyway—get over it.”24
Consumer profiling is a growing trend in the financial services
industry.25 This business trend was brought about by several converging
technological and theoretical changes. First, transaction data is no
longer being looked at as simply information, but rather as a commodity
in and of itself. Second, the data warehouse is enabling the processing
and storage of data in ways never before thought possible. Third, new
software technologies now allow data exchange where communication
22. Perhaps the best definition of this paradigm is as follows: ‘“Opt-out’ means
that financial institutions can share or sell customer information without their affirmative
up-front consent. If customers do not tell the bank to refrain from selling their data, such
sale will go on indefinitely. ‘Opt-in’ means that the default is set [on] ‘no sharing.’”
Givens, supra note 15.
23. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1
LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 97 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971).
24. This remark has been attributed to Sun Microsystems Inc.’s chief executive
officer, Scott McNealy, apparently spoken to a group of analysts and reporters at a
meeting celebrating the introduction of Sun’s new data-sharing technology. See Andrew
Roth, A New Privacy Flash Point, Courtesy of IBM?, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2001, at 1.
25. Staten, supra note 18 (describing current and potential CRM processes at
Wachovia Bank, Fidelity Investments, and Citigroup).
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difficulties had previously prevented it. Fourth, a unified market for the
exchange and sale of transaction data profiles has emerged.
A. Financial Transaction Data: From Information
to Commodity
Until relatively recently, financial institutions merely processed consumer
financial information and did not use it for marketing or other revenue
generating purposes.26 The limitations of technology and the relatively
high cost of storing and processing massive amounts of data made it
economically unfeasible for banks to peer into their customers’ personal
details.27 But as this Part later demonstrates, the limitations on transaction
surveillance are quickly evaporating with the relentless technological
advances and price decreases in data warehousing and data mining
technology. An additional impetus to this surveillance is provided by data
exchange technology that both encourages the transfer and sale of data
and facilitates the increasingly symbiotic relationship that has arisen
between financial services companies and marketing organizations.28 The
shift in technology has resulted in a paradigm shift in the meaning and
value of information itself.29 Information no longer fills its traditional role
of the “interaction[s] between environmental stimuli and intelligent
organisms,”30 but now fills a role as a marketable product in itself.31
26. Many banks have apparently been collecting consumer information for some
time, but some had absolutely no idea what on earth to do with the data until most
recently. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Elisabeth Brown);
RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 17.
27. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Elisabeth Brown)
(stating that banks have not done much with their sensitive consumer information until
very recently because of the lack of large databases and the software capability to
property manipulate and update the information). One other gating factor for banks has
been the silos in which most information has been kept. See GARTNER GROUP,
RESEARCH NOTE, BANK DATA WAREHOUSING: ALIVE (THOUGH SOMEWHAT AILING) 2
(2001). Unlinked data marts result in “inconsistent usage, data redundancy and multiple
versions of ‘the truth.’” Id. But see infra Part II.D for a discussion of why data silos will
soon cease to be a limiting factor.
28. See, e.g., FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Lynn
Wunderman) (discussing First USA as a key contributor to a data co-op). See infra notes
70–71 for a description of data co-ops.
29. See generally Glazer, supra note 18, at 129 (“A major theme of this generation
has been the onset of the ‘information age,’ a time in which information, or knowledge,
replaces matter and energy as the primary resource of society.”).
30. Id. at 131–32.
31. Id. at 149–50. Professor Rashi Glazer of the Haas School of Business,
University of California, Berkeley, states that the paradigm shift under which
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Technology companies predictably welcome this paradigm shift as an
opportunity to gain market share.32 Bill Gates sees the networked,
profiled, information-commodified future.33 In his book discussing the
future of the Internet, he described a world where massive amounts of
data would be collected on individuals with the help of numerous
authenticating devices operating at ubiquitous data collection points,
both inside and outside the home.34 Although Internet privacy has
attracted most of the attention until very recently,35 as Gates illustrated,
the Internet is just one of many collection points for transaction data in
the newly evolving “database nation.”36
And financial data is the gold standard for transaction data. Unlike
consumer data gathered from census data, from surveys, or from cookieenabled37 websites such as Amazon.com, which is generally anonymous,38
financial data is, by its nature, personally identifiable unless the account
information has become a “marketable asset” is only a very recent phenomenon which is
fundamentally redefining the “rules of the game” for commercial transactions. Id. at
138, 150.
32. See, e.g., Acxiom Corporation, Customer Data Integration: Realizing the
Promise of Customer Relationship Management, at http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain
/0,1494,USA~en~374~1737~0~0~,00.html (2001). Acxiom Corporation estimates that a
market leader in the customer data integration space would reap up to $5 billion of a total
market estimated to reach as much as $15 billion by 2004. Id. MicroStrategy
Corporation Chairman and CEO, Michael Saylor, looks forward to making “intelligence”
a tenth of the economy. See Schauer, supra note 9, at http://www.dmreview.com/
master.cfm.
33. See GATES, supra note 9, at 218–21, 266, 274.
34. See Id. However, apparently Gates believes this new privacy-invading interior
design is only for the masses. When discussing the design of the living quarters of his
own house, Gates said: “[P]rivacy is important.” Id. at 218.
35. The FTC has only recently taken up the issue of offline consumer privacy
issues. See generally FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5. Beth Givens, Director of
the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse noted in her comments to the FTC Public Workshop
on the Information Marketplace that her organization receives a greater amount of
complaints about offline privacy matters than it does about online privacy. See GIVENS
FTC COMMENTS, supra note 20.
36. The term “database nation” was coined by privacy advocate Simson Garfinkel.
GARFINKEL, supra note 4.
37. A “cookie” is a small text message sent by a Web server, which is stored by
the browser in a text file called “cookie.txt.” The cookie then enables the Web site to
receive information on the Web site visitor’s preferences. See Leon Stiel, An
Introduction to Privacy Technologies and Techno-Speak, reprinted in SECOND ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW, supra note 13, at 33, 48.
38. See ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. Several Web sites
have recently attempted to integrate anonymous Internet transaction data with databases
that convert it into personally identifiable information. The consumer backlash has
spawned class action lawsuits. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Supnick v. Amazon.com, No. C00-0221P, 2000 WL
1603820 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2000) (certifying class action); In re RealNetWorks, Inc.
Privacy Litig., No. 1329, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1458 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 10, 2000). See
generally Charles L. Kerr, Online Privacy: Recent Developments, reprinted in SECOND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW, supra note 13, at 51, 66–111.
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number, social security number, or other identifying characteristic is
either encrypted39 or deleted. Because financial data includes information
on purchasing behavior, it is deemed “psychographic data” and is
therefore considered determinate of future behavior.40 Thus, it is not
hard to understand why personally-identifiable financial data and the
value of the information therein may easily be termed the new currency
of this century.41 Indeed, the former chairman of Citicorp referred to the
information standards for the movement of personal and nonpersonal
financial data as the equivalent of money in global financial markets.42
In order to fully understand how that raw data can turn to gold, it is
necessary to review the technology behind data warehousing and
computer profiling, as well as the mechanisms supporting data
exchange.
B. The Data Warehouse
Transaction data normally resides in something called a data
warehouse.43 And the data warehouse makes good business sense for
39. Encrypted information is almost impossible to decipher in a database without
the use of the accompanying encryption key. See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6,
at 81.
40. ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 n.18 (“Psychographic data
links objective demographic characteristics like age and gender with more abstract
characteristics related to ideas, opinions and interests.”). Psychographic information is
“incredibly powerful information from a segmentation standpoint” and thus is highly
valuable to marketers. Id. Psychographic information is found in purchase behavior,
and personally identifiable data on purchase patterns is generally very difficult for
marketers to obtain on a global level, except where it is obtained voluntarily from
consumer survey or warranty card sources. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5
(remarks of Lynn Wunderman).
41. See Zimmerman & Simpson, supra note 17. Financial firms and telemarketers
consider personally-identifiable financial transaction data “among their most valuable
assets.” Id.; cf. Bob Sullivan, Bank Crime Data Theft on the Rise, MSN, June 26, 2002
(“Your concern is no longer a teller walking out the door with cash . . . . Your concern is
information walking out the door. That’s the new currency. You’ve got to think:
information equals cash.” (quoting fraud expert, Rob Douglas)), http://msnbc.com/news/
772723.asp?pne=msn&cpl=1 (last visited June 28, 2002).
42. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 261–62.
43. The data warehouse is not actually a product or a place, but rather is a process
or a “staging area” for the collection, integration, storage and delivery of information.
See INT’L DATA CORP., THE FOUNDATIONS OF WISDOM: A STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL
IMPACT OF DATA WAREHOUSING 2 (1996), available at http://www.teradatalibrary.
com/pdf/idc_010196.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2001). Data warehouses are the engines
that drive the decision support systems that utilize data mining software to find hidden
information in data. See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6, at 25–36. See also infra
note 51 for a discussion of data mining software.
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the financial services industry. Not only have hardware, software, and
data storage costs declined significantly in the past few years,44 but
empirical evidence shows that companies will rapidly reap a significant
return on their investment in such a system.45 In fact, the economic
benefits of the data warehouse are so compelling, that the few banks that
do not already possess this technology are now in the process of
developing or procuring it.46 The reduction in costs for a data
warehousing system has encouraged the financial services industry to
store massive amounts of consumer transaction data spanning over many
years.47 But, price and performance metrics aside, the real driving force
for the growth in data warehousing is the increasing sophistication of the
software analytical tools that enhance the value of the information stored
therein.48 Stored raw data is of limited value, absent a corporation’s
ability to manipulate and correlate the data to create consumer profiles.
Profiling produces economic value.49 The equation thus feeds on itself:
44. Price declines have been brought about by increased competition among direct
access storage device (DASD) manufacturers, as well as by technical advances in storage
devices. Industry software and hardware giants like IBM Corporation, Informix, Inc.,
Oracle Corporation and NCR Corporation compete for a greater share of their corporate
customers’ information technology budgets by waging a war of terabyte capacity per
dollar. See Lou Agosta, Data Warehouse Volume Growth Continues, IDEABYTE, June 5,
2001, available at http://www.teradatalibrary.com/pdf/giga_060501.pdf (last visited Oct.
27, 2001). System manufacturers compete for the top performance in TPC Benchmark
tests. According to Giga Information Group, the most recent Transaction Processing
Performance Council (TPC) Benchmark indicates that the overall price versus
performance metric for a multi-terabyte decision support system shows costs per 3000
GB to be as low as $999. Id. A terabyte is defined as “a measure of computer storage
capacity and is 2 to the 40th power or approximately a thousand billion bytes.”
SearchStorage.com, at http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid5_gci
213118,00.html (last visited March 16, 2002). Aetna Insurance Corporation was
recently reported to possess 174.6 terabytes of customer information. See Barry Nance,
Managing Tons of Data, COMPUTERWORLD, April 23, 2001, at 62, available at http://www.
computerworld.com/hardwaretopics/hardware/server/story/0,10801,59819,0.html.
45. A survey by International Data Corporation indicated that a company will
receive an average three-year return on investment of 401% from a data warehouse
implementation. INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 5.
46. See META GROUP, DATA WAREHOUSE SCORECARD: COST OF OWNERSHIP AND
SUCCESSES IN APPLICATION OF DATA WAREHOUSE TECHNOLOGY 1, available at
http://www.teradatalibrary.com/pdf. Fully eighty-five percent of all banks utilize either
a data warehouse, a data warehouse with data marts, or unlinked data marts to store data.
In the interest of pursuing “revenue-producing opportunities” and obtaining one view of
the customer, many banks with unlinked data marts are now working to consolidate
them. See GARTNER GROUP, supra note 27.
47. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 1, 4–5. Royal Bank of Canada, for
example, has been collecting customer data since 1978. This data has recently been used
by the bank to create profiles on nine million of their personal retail clients. See NCR
CORPORATION, CUSTOMER SUCCESS STORIES: ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 1, 5 (2000),
available at http://www.teradatalibrary.com/pdf/eb1323.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
48. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 1.
49. See, e.g., Nance, supra note 44 (“Multiple terabytes of the most pampered,

954

FINALGERTZ.DOC

[VOL. 39: 943, 2002]

2/11/2020 3:23 PM

Consumer Profiling in Financial Services
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

increased storage of data drives the increased use of profiling; the value
of profiled data creates a value proposition to justify the increased
collection and storage of data.50
C. Software Applications
The various software applications that are used to extract hidden
information out of data are grouped under the evocative term, “data
mining.”51 Companies are spending vast amounts of money to procure
data mining software in the hopes of leveraging off of the value inherent
in the data piling up in their data warehouses.52 Customer relationship
management (CRM)53 software, which utilizes statistical modeling
techniques54 on transaction data to analyze a customer’s potential future
purchase behavior,55 is estimated to grow at a rate of forty percent per
year, and to capture between $10 and $20 billion of the corporate

best-maintained data in the world are just a slag heap of bits without accurate,
meaningful data definitions and schemas.”).
50. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 1 (“The organizations studied by IDC
provided ample evidence that [the goal of leveraging data to make better decisions] is
well worth the effort, and cost, of building effective data warehouses.”).
51. See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6, at 47 (explaining that data mining is
an idea and generally describes the process of finding hidden information in data). The
various tools that are included under the definition are: query tools, statistical techniques,
visualization, online analytical processing (OLAP), case-based learning, decision trees,
association rules, neural networks, and genetic algorithms. Id. While Data mining only
describes the discovery process, knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) is a more
general term describing the “whole process of extraction of knowledge from data” and
includes machine learning, statistics, database technology, expert systems and data
visualization. Id. at 5.
52. See Acxiom Corporation, supra note 32. International Data Corporation (IDC)
data indicates that $90 billion was spent by corporations in 1999 for data warehousing,
enterprise resource management (ERM) and customer relationship management (CRM)
products and that the expected growth rates would double by 2002. Id.
53. CRM is a term used to describe the utilization of analytical and decisioning
tools on front and back office data to look at an individual’s profile to predict their future
purchasing patterns. A primary use of the technology is to identify the most profitable
customers. See Judith Lamont, Analytical CRM: Capturing Data to Cater to Customers,
KMWORLD, Feb. 2001, at 16, available at http://www.kmworld.com/publications/
magazine/index.cfm?action=readarticle&article_id=987&publication_id=1.
54. For an example of a CRM model, see MICHEL WEDEL & WAGNER A.
KAMAKURA, MARKET SEGMENTATION: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
316–20 (2d ed. 2000).
55. CRM software may have fallen short of its technological promise, however.
See Kevin Fogarty, Is CRM a Faint Hope?, COMPUTERWORLD, June 4, 2001, at 50. In
Mr. Fogarty’s words, CRM was a “boondoggle.” Id.
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information technology expenditures in 2001 alone.56 But CRM is
quickly being eclipsed by a superior technology referred to as “business
intelligence.”57 Business intelligence software uses advanced data
visualization tools and artificial intelligence, 58 often in the form of
neural networks,59 to find hidden patterns in data that human users might
overlook.60
The development of CRM and business intelligence software has
changed the data warehouse from a tool used to improve process
efficiency and collect data into a tool used to construct and analyze
individual consumer profiles and to predict individual consumers’ future
behavior.61 Companies use this software to process a consumer’s
transaction data in order to extract an expression of the consumer’s very
personality, which is then distilled down into a convenient packet of
computer code.62 That simulated personality can then be internally used
by a company for its commercial advantage for purposes such as
customer relationship management and predictive marketing—or that
personality can be sold.

56. Id.; Lamont, supra note 53, at 16.
57. One industry pundit pauses to assure us that this term is not an oxymoron.
Dan Miller, 5 Technologies You Need to Know, INDUSTRY STANDARD, at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,24308,00.html (May 21, 2001).
58. Artificial Intelligence refers to computer systems that self-learn or otherwise
model human knowledge. See KENNETH C. LAUDON ET AL., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND SOCIETY 491–50 (1994).
59. The most common form of artificial intelligence is found in neural networks.
Neural networks attempt to mimic the operation of the human brain by means of
thousands of transistors connected in a network. See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note
6, at 2–3, 68–78; LAUDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 497. Neural networks have been
criticized as “black boxes” that produce a decisioning system that is impossible to audit
for discriminatory criteria. See generally Marcia Stepanek, Weblining, BUS. WK., April
3, 2000, at EB26, EB33 (stating that the value assumptions used by the black box
software cannot be determined with precision even by the system’s developers).
60. See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6, at 68–78. One industry analyst
discussed business intelligence as a further generation of the technology provided in
knowledge management and data mining. Miller, supra note 57. Business intelligence
uses artificial intelligence to discover unexpected patterns in data. Id. The market for
business intelligence software is expected to grow to $8.8 billion in 2004, and the
corporate players include giants such as IBM Corporation, Oracle Corporation, SAP,
Computer Associates and Microsoft Corporation. Id. According to Michael Saylor,
CEO of MicroStrategy Corporation, business intelligence can come in several forms:
analytics (optimal merchandizing, inventory, fraud detection), narrowcasting (predictive
analytics, arbitrage, and demand activation) and “embedded intelligence” (for example, a
“bank account that moves its own cash around”). See Schauer, supra note 9, at
http://www.dmreview.com/master.cfm.
61. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 4, 12.
62. Customer behavior as recorded in transaction data has been referred to in
Business Week magazine as a “silicon simulacrum.” Jonathan Berry et al., A Potent New
Tool for Selling: Database Marketing, BUS. WK., Sept. 5, 1994, at 56, 58.
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D. Profile Exchange Mechanisms
As a major financial industry publication recently pointed out, the
current inability of different file formats to “speak the same language”
has up to now been a major enforcer of consumer privacy.63 But the
commercial rewards to be gained have spawned an entire industry
focused on developing universal data exchange mechanisms to
overcome this barrier. The XML, or extensible markup language64
platform, has been termed the “lingua franca of cyberspace”65 and has
the potential to enable the widespread sharing of data over the Internet.66
Another such mechanism for information sharing in development, the
Customer Profile Exchange Network, is based on the XML format and is
backed by a consortium of technology companies and several financial
services industry partners.67 Data from disparate sources that does not
utilize one of these universal communication languages can otherwise be
unified by universal data exchange software applications.68 The
63. See Roth, supra note 24.
64. See Klein, supra note 9. Microsoft Corporation is developing its Hailstorm
technology on the XML platform. Hailstorm is part of Microsoft’s .Net initiative and
may prove to be particularly invasive because it is being designed to work only in
conjunction with an authentication and identification device. Id. American Express
entered discussions with Microsoft to partner in the .Net initiative to offer its cardholders
instant notification of potential fraud on their account. Id.
65. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Richard Smith).
66. Id.
67. Backers of the consortium include International Business Machines Corporation,
Hewlett-Packard Company, Intuit, Lucent Technology, First Union National Bank,
HSBC-USA, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Charles Schwab Corporation. See Roth, supra
note 24. First Union Corporation released a statement indicating that they valued their
customers’ privacy and that they joined the consortium “to stay informed of new
technologies and how those technologies will benefit our customers.” Id. For more
information on the consortium, see Customer Profile Exchange Network, at
http://www.cpexchange.org. As of March 2001, the consortium had over ninety
corporate members. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Dana
Rosenfeld).
68. Acxiom Corporation recently introduced a product called AbiliTecsm, enabling
one view of the customer to be built out of disparate data sources. See ABERDEENGROUP,
ANNOUNCEMENT PROFILE, ACXIOM’S ABILITEC: KEY TO CREATING A TOTAL CUSTOMER
VIEW (1999), available at http://acxiom.com/interactive/dpdwebdev/productsandservices
/brochure/pdfs/aberdeen.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2002). Hummingbird Communications
highlights the significant cost reductions and increased efficiency their universal data
exchange product can provide to a company dealing with information from disparate
systems or databases. See HUMMINGBIRD COMMUNICATIONS LTD., UNIVERSAL DATA
EXCHANGE: AN ENTERPRISE-WIDE SOLUTION (2000), available at http://www.
hummingbird.com/collateral/universaldataexchange_whitepaper_EN.pdf (last visited May
25, 2002).
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resulting ease of data transfer and data matching has encouraged the
formation of “data intermediaries”69 and “co-op database[s],”70 where
information and profiles containing the life traces of individuals are
offered and purchased like any other commodity.71 Data exchange is also
increased by the fact that data sharing is increasingly de rigueur between
alliance partners under today’s marketing alliance agreement.72 To quell
consumers’ concerns over the loss of their privacy, many of the companies
selling information exchange technology argue that their technologies
enforce customer privacy preferences while still allowing the free flow of
data.73 But some are skeptical that these technologies will be utilized in a
way that will give consumers any real privacy protections.74
69. A “data compiler” is defined as a “third party organization[ ] that collect[s],
slice[s], and dice[s] and then resell[s] consumer data.” See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE,
supra note 5 (remarks of Professor Culnan). A data compiler will not usually have a
direct relationship with the data subject. Id. One data compiler refers to itself as an
“infomediary.” Id. (remarks of Johnny Anderson). The data compilers apparently
operate on an informal consortium basis amongst themselves. Allison Brown, an
attorney for the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection remarked at the FTC Public
Workshop on the Information Marketplace that “[o]ne thing that becomes clear pretty
quickly is how integrated the aggregators are with the sources and how the data sort of
rotate in and out of the different databases.” Id. (remarks of Allison Brown). According
to the statement of one participant at this FTC workshop, even data on pharmaceutical
purchases and doctor’s visits may end up in the hands of the data compilers. Id.
(remarks of Michael Pashby).
70. The term “co-op database” refers to an arrangement where members of the coop pool their customer transaction data and profiles in order to gain the opportunity to
receive the data contributed by other members. Id. (remarks of Lynn Wunderman).
71. This information marketplace is a phenomenon distinct to the U.S. One theory
of why U.S. mortgage rates are up to two percent lower than those in Europe is that the
standardized consumer credit information in the U.S. makes wider securitization
possible. See CATE, supra note 9, at 4. One European participant at the FTC Public
Workshop on the Information Marketplace expressed his disbelief and outrage at the
U.S. information marketplace as follows: “[W]here will it end? At which point do I say,
[t]his data is sacrosanct, you cannot have access to it . . . will it just be taken for granted
that this is just another piece of information that can be used to market to me?” See FTC
INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Mark Le Maitre).
72. See RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 137 (indicating that information sharing
is expected by most businesses entering into any form of alliance agreement).
73. See, e.g., Cristina Lourosa-Ricardo, What’s Ahead for Privacy: Technology
Has Taken away Privacy. Now It Promises To Give It Back, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2001,
at R-17. An analyst at Forrester Research indicated that the Customer Profile Exchange
will manage data at such a granular level that consumer privacy preferences will be able
to follow information as it is passed along. See Roth, supra note 24. An Acxiom
Corporation spokesperson made the argument that their data matching software and the
increased profiling that it will enable will foster an increasingly personalized customer
experience which will build trust in the merchant and thus alleviate a consumer’s privacy
concerns. See Staten, supra note 18.
74. See e.g., FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Richard Smith)
(expressing skepticism that the privacy controls in the Consumer Profile Exchange
would be implemented); Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy:
Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
743, 751–55 (2000) (referring to the “blinking twelve” problem; that is, privacy system
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The silo walls are falling down. This is a revolution, albeit a silent
one.75 It thus behooves us to stop to consider the socioeconomic effects
of this information revolution.
III. PROFILING: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS
“Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is
the knowledge we have lost in information?” 76
A. Social Effects
Proponents of the information revolution often depict the social
benefits of profiling as a return to the good old days where shopkeepers
knew their customers by name, knew their special preferences, and thus
interjected a personal element into the commercial experience.77 One
proponent even referred to data profiling and the resulting customer
relationship management techniques as the “old fashioned” way of doing
business.78 But others are less sanguine about the social effects of a
commercial ecosystem built on profiling79 and have sought to distinguish
profiling from traditional marketing practices. One important difference
is rooted in the permanent record that transaction data leaves behind. As
Lawrence Lessig states:
Gossipy neighbors might have watched, but their watching produced nothing as
lasting or as reliable as . . . a credit card system’s endless collection of data
about your purchases, or the telephone system’s records of who you called
when and for how long. . . . Then the technology noticed only what was
different; now it notices any transaction.80

defaults will be set to allow data transfer and consumers will respond in the same manner
as they do to their VCRs, which they have absolutely no clue how to reprogram). This
author’s own example of this phenomenon is that because every new version of
Microsoft Explorer seems to make the “disable cookies” function more inconvenient for
her to locate than it was before, she tends not to bother.
75. See Glazer, supra note 18, at 127, 129. Lawrence Lessig compared the
information revolution to the breakup of the Soviet Union in regard to its far-reaching
consequences. See LESSIG, supra note 14, at 234.
76. T.S. Eliot, THE ROCK pt. I (1934).
77. See, e.g., PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 9, at 21; Siebel Corporation
Advertisement (CBS Television Network, June 24, 2001) (viewed by author).
78. See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 9, at 21.
79. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra, note 14, at 154–56; Schwartz, supra note 74, at 746–
49. See generally Stepanek, supra note 59.
80. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 151. In fact, if any analogy can be drawn to an
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Furthermore, traditional interchanges of information always left
consumers with a choice of which information was to be shared with the
merchant and which information they chose to keep secret. Computer
profiling takes away the consumer’s choice of providing selective
information to others. Although this full disclosure could produce a
positive result by providing businesses with a practical means of
preventing consumer fraud, it could also provide businesses with a new
means of manipulating their customers.81 This manipulation could take
the form of a discriminatory regime of customer ranking based on
existing prejudices, which some have suggested will ossify society and
chill free association and behavioral autonomy.82
The customer ranking that accompanies profiling is already well
entrenched in the financial services sector.83 Sanwa Bank gives As to its
best customers, but those whose profile indicates that they will produce
less profit for the bank earn Cs.84 Predictably, the bank tends to charge
those earning Cs more fees and puts them on hold more often and for
longer periods of time.85 Statistics show that eighty percent of a bank’s
profit is gained from only twenty percent of their customers.86 It is
therefore no surprise that evidence indicates that banks utilize profiling
software not only to provide superior customer service, but also to
existing marketing practice, the closest parallel is the A.C. Neilsen Company’s practice
of collecting data on consumers’ television viewing habits. Such tracking only takes
place by invitation. See Nielsen Media Research, What if Nielsen TV Ratings Contacts
Me?, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com (2002).
81. Posner suggested that the law does not always require the “shrewd bargainer”
to disclose to the other party to the transaction the facts of the bargainer’s true opinion of
the value of the transaction. He suggested that this shrewdness does at one point cross
the line into fraud. The line is crossed, according to Posner, when the information that a
party seeks to conceal is not a product of significant investment. Richard A. Posner, The
Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397–98 (1978).
82. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 74, at 755–62. Paul Schwartz saw a risk to
democratization of opportunity by a restriction of economic and information
opportunity by means of profiling in its reinforcement of existing prejudices and
mistaken beliefs. Id. at 757. Schwartz also predicted a substantial restriction of
autonomous decisionmaking as a result of the oppressive force of constant surveillance.
Id. at 758–59 (“The threat to autonomy is through a coercive influence that takes over, or
subtly and persistently colonizes, a person’s thinking process.”).
83. See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 26–27.
84. Id. First Union National Bank uses a similar ranking system called “Einstein.”
It uses colors instead of letter grades. Marginal customers are accorded a red ranking.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Lamont, supra note 53. This theory is commonly known as the “Pareto
Principle,” so named after Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian economist and sociologist who
postulated the theory. See Don Bauder, Blame That Troublesome 20% for 80% of the
Problems, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sept. 9, 2001, at H2. Pareto was branded a fascist
for supporting a theory of the superiority of the elite by virtue of his statement that
twenty percent of the people will always control eighty percent of the wealth. Id.
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identify their most profitable customers and to “fire” their unprofitable,
or even less profitable, customers.87 Furthermore, it is not beyond the
imagination to expect that a customer who has been fired might also
have that fact reflected in (or otherwise inferable from) their profile that
is sold to the data co-op market.88 The net effect is likely to be less
access and less financial choice for the economically disadvantaged who
either earn a marginal profile by virtue of their socioeconomic status or
who do not produce high profit margins for a financial institution.89
These exclusionary decisions may be made on the basis of inaccurate
assumptions. Far from being scientific,90 the decisions generated by
profiling technology may actually be discriminatory.91 In fact, in the
context of profiling by financial services, profiling may simply be a new
and insidious legal form of discrimination that merely automates oldfashioned redlining practices.92 Because the criteria used for profiling
decisions are often hidden inside the “black box” of a neural network or
other computer self-learning algorithm,93 the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA),94 which strictly prohibits discriminatory lending practices,
87. In the words of one banking software developer, “Not all customers are created
equal.” Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 28.
88. This is the flip side of what is now occurring with regard to high-value
customers who are being “bought and sold like derivative securities.” Id. at EB 29.
89. See Balvinder S. Sangha, Online Lending Brings with It Issues of Equal Credit
Access, AM. BANKER, March 16, 2001, at 17.
90. The assumptions made by computer profiling technology can be inscrutable.
See, e.g., Sandra Martin, Is Little Brother Watching You?, THE GLOBE AND MAIL REP. ON
BUS. MAG., Aug. 25, 2000, at 70 (observing that Amazon.com decided author Simson
Garfinkel was interested in erotic lesbian films based on his prior purchase of online
women’s literature and his browsing of books on computer networking), available at
http://www.robmagazine.com/servlet/ GIS.Servlets.HTMLTemplate?tf=robm.
91. See Sangha, supra note 89. Whereas banks have historically offered equal
rates for financing to all customers who met acceptable credit standards, the “risk based”
pricing that transaction profiling brings will mean unaffordable financial products for
some high risk consumers. Higher risk scores will be given to certain demographic
groups, which may cause systematic pricing differentials that are racially defined. Id.
Neural networks are known for making generalizations that are not contextually defined
and thus could produce inapposite conclusions that exceed the most egregious form of
traditional discrimination. See LAUDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 493 (“[I]t thinks
everything in the shape of a car is a car, even if the shape is a paper cutout!”).
92. See ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 13.
93. Professor Joel Reidenberg of Fordham University remarked about the microprofiles
created by value assumptions generated by self-learning neural networks: “Some of this really
crosses the line into offensiveness.” Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 33.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000) (prohibiting the use of information relating to sex, race,
color, religion, national origin, age, or marital status for purposes of making discriminatory
credit decisions).
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may be effectively skirted with probable impunity.95 This is due to the
fact that under the new one-to-one marketing regime in use by financial
institutions, a consumer unfortunate enough to possess a profile that
produces a substandard score from the predictive black box would be
discriminated against not in the context of a credit denial per se, but
rather by virtue of a marketing decision by the financial institution to
either withhold the offer entirely from the consumer or to price the offer
unfavorably, thus providing a disincentive to a consumer’s acceptance of
the financial product offering.96 Because the decisions based on profiles
are inscrutable even to the developers of the profiling software,97 it
would be difficult if not nearly impossible for the wronged consumer to
prove that the criteria utilized in a decision generated by a black box was
in fact discriminatory under the ECOA.98
These social effects are all the more disturbing when one considers
that the data used to profile consumers may simply be wrong or
outdated.99 If the error rate in data utilized by the credit reporting
agencies is any guideline, the error rate may be as high as forty-three
percent.100 Consumers have little opportunity to discover or correct
these errors. Unlike the right of review and correction for consumer
credit reports, which is codified under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA),101 consumers currently have no notice of adverse decisions
made on the basis of their transaction profiles, no mechanism to see their
profiles to audit for errors, and no right of correction for erroneous
95. According to Dierdre Mulligan, staff counsel at the Center for Democracy &
Technology, it is extremely hard to prove discrimination resulting from the use of
personal information. Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal
Info. What’s in it for You?, BUS. WK., April 5, 1999, at 84.
96. For example, consider a profile showing an individual who lives in a zip code
classified as low income and predominantly minority, subscribes to a women’s
magazine, does not have a joint checking account, and regularly contributes to the local
African Methodist Episcopal church. If this person is accordingly assigned a high risk
score by a predictive computer model that determines that these data points are
undesirable, and she is thus offered credit at prohibitively high rates or not advised of the
availability of a suitable financial product at all, that (possibly legal) decision would
likely have the substantially similar net effect as would an illegal denial of credit
resulting from discriminatory redlining that was based specifically and demonstratively
on the fact that she was a single, black female.
97. See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 30 (stating that scientists cannot vouch for
the accuracy of conclusions nor can they determine how the technology reached any
particular conclusion).
98. Some have remarked about the dearth of legislative and regulatory guidance on
the subject of when risk based pricing and other decisions taken on the basis of profiling
constitute an ECOA violation. See Sangha, supra note 89.
99. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 299.
100. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 212 (1992).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). For a discussion of the FCRA, see infra notes 197–
211 and accompanying text.
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data.102 And by some accounts, banks may be relying less on consumer
credit reports from the credit reporting agencies to support their
consumer lending decisions, relying instead on their available
transaction profiles.103
Although it is reasonable to price financial products differentially
according to objective risk based on a consumer’s credit report, payment
history, or other factors with a direct and substantial link to credit risk,
that is distinguishable from the practice of pricing financial products by
means of predictive assumptions made by computer models based on
attenuated generalizations deduced from randomly aggregated transaction
patterns. The information revolution is likely to produce a structure
where the disadvantaged receive less service, less choice, and less
attractive terms for financial products due to discriminatory practices
hidden in the guise of low profile scores.104 The economic impacts of
profiling are likely to further aggravate this situation.
B. Economic Effects: Pareto Optimal Efficiency
or Market Failure?
Increased profiling and data sharing practices will modify the balance
of power within the financial services industry. Financial industry
spokespersons have argued that information sharing in financial services
is critically necessary to allow small financial institutions to obtain a
greater cache of data from marketing partners to enable them to better
compete with the larger financial holding companies.105 However, the
102. The FCRA explicitly excludes “experience information” and any information
disclosed among affiliated entities from the definition of a consumer credit report. Thus
this type of data is not subject to provisions in the FCRA concerning transparency,
notice, and restrictions on use of consumer credit reports. See 15 U.S.C. §
1681a(d)(2)(A) (2000).
103. See H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY 25–27 (1994). This practice does not
make the bank a consumer reporting agency subject to regulation under the FCRA. See
infra note 199.
104. As one letter writer to Business Week magazine stated the issue: “[P]ersonal
information will be used to discriminate against the less successful, less healthy, or
otherwise less commercially desirable among us. . . . How many companies won’t be
financed on the founder’s credit cards because the cards weren’t issued in the first
place?” Readers Report, “Weblining” Could Sideline Would-Be Entrepreneurs, BUS.
WK., April 24, 2000, at 14 (letter of David Raab).
105. The GLBA’s purpose was to facilitate the affiliation of banks, insurance
companies, and other financial services companies. See H.R. REP NO. 106-434, at 145
(1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 246. The GLBA’s adherents indicated that the
legislation would enable smaller financial institutions to compete with larger entities
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increased information sharing and resultant profiling that is now allowed
under the GLBA106 is just as likely to create extreme competitive
imbalances between the small financial institutions and the large
financial holding companies. Smaller institutions rely on their ability to
serve niche markets to achieve profitability.107 However, the increased
customer segmentation that will be possible with profiling may allow the
larger financial holding companies to cut into those traditional niche
markets that smaller institutions have traditionally served.108 Thus,
instead of helping the smaller institutions to compete with the much
larger financial holding companies, the information sharing practices
allowed under the GLBA may actually serve to cripple the smaller
financial institutions. And small community banks and thrifts generally
serve the less affluent or more rural portions of society.109
In addition to changing the competitive structure of the financial
services industry, profiling alters the economic balance between the
individual consumer and the financial institution.110 By profiling
consumers, financial institutions can predict an individual’s demand and
price point sensitivity111 and thus can alter the balance of power in their
price and value negotiations with that individual. Statistics indicate that
the power shift facilitated by predictive profiling has proven highly
with affiliates, perhaps because of the power granted them to share data with unaffiliated
third parties. See 145 CONG. REC. E2237 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1999) (statement of Hon.
James Leach) (“The power under the act will provide community banks a credible basis
to compete with financial institutions of any size or any specialty and in addition to offer,
in similar ways, services that new entrants into financial markets, such as Internet or
computer software companies, may originate.”).
106. For a description of the information sharing provisions of the GLBA, see infra
notes 212–31 and accompanying text.
107. Robert W. Dixon, Note, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
Act: Why Reform in the Financial Services Industry Was Necessary and the Act’s
Projected Effects on Community Banking, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 671, 672–75 (2001).
108. The move to Internet banking and other Web-based customer interfaces will
further aggravate this trend. Forrester Research says that twenty-three percent of
companies are already using the Net to “micro-segment” their customers. See Stepanek,
supra note 59, at EB 29.
109. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S13876 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Hagel); Dixon, supra note 107, at 674–75.
110. Companies are able to keep what amounts to a dynamic profit and loss
statement on their customers. See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 28. Forrester
Research suggests that customers will be bought and sold “like derivative securities.” Id.
Some comments submitted to the FTC expressed the view that the targeting of
consumers by profiling is manipulative. See ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note
10, at 14.
111. RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 43 (referring to this as “the great value shift,”
which will affect pricing as well as the value of what is sold). Some have suggested that
this information imbalance could constitute a deceptive trade practice under consumer
protection laws. See Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices
Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2001).
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profitable for the financial services industry.112 However, there is little
evidence that indicates that any of these profits or cost savings are being
passed on to consumers. For this reason, and because most consumers
have no practical ability to negotiate price terms for the exchange of
their data, many characterize the commercial exploitation of consumer
transaction data as a classic example of a market failure.113
Some have suggested correcting this market failure by creating a
consumer’s property right in their transaction data, thereby creating the
basis for a market where data can be traded for value like any other
commodity.114 Proponents of this solution cite the resultant market
efficiency benefits of an economy blessed by the ideal of classic
economic theory: perfect efficiency based on perfect knowledge.115
However, others suggest that due to valuation difficulties and the
unequal bargaining positions between consumers and corporations, a
property rights approach to personal information would create a market
failure of even greater dimensions than what currently exists.116 In
112. See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 32. Profiling enabled Sanwa Bank to
realize productivity increases amounting to fourteen percent in one year, First Union saw
an eighteen percent increase in one year. Visa International saves millions of dollars
annually from its risk analysis technology. Id. at EB 28. The financial industry has the
highest return of investment on a data warehouse, at close to twenty-five percent. INT’L.
DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 9 fig.1.
113. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal
Paradigm? Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000)
(“[T]he company internalizes the gains from using the information but can externalize
some of the losses and so has a systematic incentive to overuse it.”) (quoting PETER P.
SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998)); Paul M. Schwartz, supra
note 74, at 763 (a bilateral monopoly). But see RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 42
(suggesting that profiling is simply a self-defense response by business to the ever
increasing competitive pressures that have resulted from the growing ability of
consumers to access instant data about a product’s features, price, and value).
114. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 14, at 160–63.
115. See id. For the classic discussion of economic theory as it relates to liability
rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Under
Pareto-optimal market theory, “[i]t is the capacity of the market to induce disclosure of
individual preferences which makes it theoretically possible for the market to bring about
exchanges leading to Pareto optimality.” Id. at 1095 n.13.
116. See Schwartz, supra note 74, at 763–76 (arguing against the use of a market
solution based in property rights in data to provide consumers with control over their
data). Schwartz feared that the commodification of personal data will result in a bilateral
monopoly producing contracts of adhesion of a new dimension and a resultant market
failure of monumental proportions. Id. at 763. See generally Samuelson, supra note 113
(arguing that a licensing approach rooted in trade secrecy law is superior to a property
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addition, any scheme based on property rights necessarily encourages
alienability,117 and thus rather than discouraging the commercial
exploitation of a person’s identity, establishment of property rights in
transaction data would likely have the effect of encouraging this
exploitation by establishing the financial institution’s ownership to any
and all data that a consumer provided to it for purposes of a commercial
transaction. In short, a property rights regime would set in motion a
significant transfer of economic and market power to the data collectors.
Indeed, a theory creating a market for data seems improbable when
one considers that the propertization and commodification of information
actually turns classic economic theory on its head.118 Information,
unlike tangible assets, resists any real codification under an economic
theory of value, because it defies measurement, it is not easily divisible
or appropriable,119 it typically is not subject to scarcity, it is not a thing
that is owned by one party to the exclusion of another, it does not
decrease in value with use, and it probably will not exhibit decreasing
returns of marginal utility to scale.120 In addition, information is difficult
to value because it often exhibits wide divergence between its value of
use and its exchange value due to the fact that it does not respond to the
rules of supply and demand.121 Market inefficiency results because a
consumer is likely to part with his or her information for a much lower
price than the actual value of the information to the data collector.122
rights regime). For an analysis of why a property rights theory would be unlikely to
improve information privacy, see generally Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy: A
New Legal Paradigm? Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1283 (2000).
117. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 115, at 1092.
118. See Glazer, supra note 18, at 135.
119. One author suggests that commodifying digital information would make it an
act of theft to exchange recipe ideas with a friend or neighbor, invalidating the theories
of the progress of the arts and sciences that lie at the foundation of Enlightenment
philosophy. Rosemary J. Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REV.
237, 239 (1996).
120. Glazer, supra note 18, at 135–36.
121. See id.; see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1461, 1502–03 (2000) (discussing how consumers underestimate the actual
marginal value of their data because they are often unaware of the aggregate value of
their profile); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815,
830–34 (2000).
The standard definition by economists of price discrimination is that under it a
seller sets ‘different prices to different purchasers depending not on the costs
of selling to them, . . . but on the elasticity of their demands for his product.’
In contrast, privacy price discrimination involves a differentiation by data
processing companies among individuals with varying preferences about the
use of their personal data.
Id. (quoting R. Posner).
122. Because consumers have little ability to either reduce the supply of their data
or to increase the price, a “subsidy is given to those data processing companies that
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And the data collector, if not forced to internalize the costs of a
consumer’s privacy preferences, is likely to engage in wasteful behavior,
such as increased marketing to consumers who do not desire to receive
such offers.123
Judge Posner analyzed privacy in economic terms and concluded that
the high transaction costs associated with assigning property rights to
individuals in their data suggest that information secrets should become
the property of those to whom they are disclosed.124 However, Posner
also suggested that this analysis is only valid where information privacy
fills the role of an “intermediate good” and not the final good itself.125
Posner suggested that where privacy becomes a final good, the economic
analysis comes “to a grinding halt” because “tastes are unanalyzable from
an economic standpoint.”126 But, the privacy interest in aggregated and
profiled personal information cannot be looked at as merely an
intermediate good, because the profile is no longer information per se, but
instead is a marketable commodity.127 And not just any commodity, but a
derivative work of personal information that contains the essence of self.
exploit personal data.” Schwartz, supra note 121, at 833.
123. Id.
124. See Posner, supra note 81, at 398. Courts considering whether a person has
ownership of his biological information have arrived at a similar conclusion. See Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a patient did not
have a conversion cause of action against his physician for use of his spleen cells to
patent a cell line). The few courts that have accorded property rights in biological
information to the donor have only done so where a contract between the donor and
recipient established a legal obligation toward a tangible thing of value similar to a
bailment. See Southeastern Fertility Ctr. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 99-1736, 2000
WL 223339 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2000) (finding that sperm was personal property, and
therefore, its destruction was excluded from coverage under the insurance policy
exclusion for coverage of damage to the personal property of others in the care, custody,
and control of the insured).
125. Posner, supra note 81, at 394 (“Under [the intermediate good] approach,
people are assumed not to desire or value privacy or prying in themselves . . . .”).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 243–53. The concept of a derivative
product of transaction information that encompasses and emulates the personality is not
farfetched science fiction. Technology increasingly enables the simulation of the persona,
particularly the predictive agent technology that utilizes unstructured text in natural
language. Such technology enables a computer to read a large set of text messages to
extract pertinent information into a machine-readable form. “The profile could know every
document you’ve ever read, every person you’ve ever known, every place you’ve ever
been, and every word you’ve ever said that has been recorded. Your identity would no
longer exist just inside of you, but in the model.” Id. at 252. As an example of this, a
computer program was developed at Yale University that emulated the personality of Cyrus
Vance, responded to questions as if from his memory, and “thought of itself as Vance.” Id.
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Concerns over the potential ramifications of corporate ownership of
these derivatives of personality and the potentially disturbing socioeconomic
effects of profiling have driven many legal scholars to search for a legal
solution to regulate or otherwise control the practice.128 But the search
for a legal oasis of privacy protection in U.S. common law and statutory
authority has unfortunately led most to a destination resembling a
waterless desert.129
IV. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE U.S.
“[T]hese are the business records of the banks.”130
Privacy is an ancient concept. The inviolate right of a person to a
protected zone of privacy that cannot be invaded by the outside world is
traceable in the earliest codification of the laws of western civilization.
The Code of Hammurabi provided the death penalty for any “breach into
a house.”131 The Mosaic Law provides that no man may enter into his
neighbor’s house to collect a pledge for a debt, but rather requires that
the creditor must wait outside for the debtor to collect the pledge from
inside the house and bring it out to his creditor.132 Under Roman law the
128. See, e.g., id. at 253 (suggesting that it may be necessary to utilize the doctrine
of compilation copyright to protect against the “extraction of self”); Ann Bartow, Our
Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 704
(2000) (suggesting property rights in data combined with reverse click wrap
agreements); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000) (arguing for a fundamental right of
information privacy grounded in autonomy); Susan M. Giles, Promises Betrayed:
Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 52–84
(1995) (analyzing the use of the breach of confidence tort for protecting privacy, and
concluding it would be unconstitutional); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1313 (2000) (concluding that a legislative solution is
the best answer, but that any legislation will be watered down by special interest groups);
Reidenberg, supra note 100, at 236–43 (arguing for the implementation of some coherent
and consistent privacy rights in the U.S., but warning that any general U.S. scheme to
protect privacy will need to incorporate a more flexible administrative mechanism to
avoid the implementation problems seen in Europe); Francis S. Chalpowski, Note, The
Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 158–59 (1991)
(arguing for a constitutional right rooted in Lockean property rights).
129. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 121, at 1543 (“There is no magic bullet, no
panacea. If the privacy pessimists are to be proved wrong, the great diversity of new
privacy-destroying technologies will have to be met with a legal and social response that
is at least as subtle and multifaceted as the technological challenge.”).
130. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
131. See 1 ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVOLUTION OF LAW 395
(1915).
132. See Deuteronomy 24:10–11. This principle is retained in the common law
under which even a bailiff of the court is enjoined from entering a house to regain
another’s property. NELSON LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
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hearth and home was accorded the status of a sanctuary from any
invader and any person entering the home of another—even to serve a
summons—was guilty of invasion of privacy.133 The concept of Roman
Injuria also reached beyond the protections of hearth and home to
include the protection of the personality and reputation. Thus, the
Injuria of Roman law criminalized the action of shouting until a crowd
gathered around an individual as well as the act of following an honest
woman or young boy or girl.134
The expression “a man’s home is his castle” predates English
jurisprudence,135 but certainly in feudal Britain, identity, self-worth and
legal protection were directly linked to the land and the baronial
estate.136 As such, feudal society came to link the concept of protection
from the invasions of the outside world as well as the concept of identity
with the concept of real property.137
Perhaps upon a feudal basis linking identity with the notion of real
property estates, Locke, Hume, Bentham, and others developed the
Enlightenment theories of law based on proprietary rights and those
rights’ relationship to freedom and the inviolate self, which were the
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13–15 (1970), reprinted in RICHARD
C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (1999).
133. See PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND METHODS, supra note 132, at 7–8; see also
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905) (discussing the
history of the right to privacy).
134. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 71; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 n.1 (1890) (“Injuria, in the narrower sense, is
every intentional and illegal violation of honour, i.e., the whole personality of another.”
(quoting SALKOWSKI, ROMAN LAW 668–69 n.2 (n.d.)).
135. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223
(1877) (“[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a
man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with
impunity: agreeing herein with the sentiments of ancient Rome.”).
136. See Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603) (“[T]he house of
every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and
violence, as for his repose.”) (citation omitted).
137. The close identification of real property rights with identity can be seen in the
incidence of sumptuary laws in Renaissance Britain. The disintegration of the feudal
system and the dislocation from the land and resulting problems with loss of identity
among the feudal classes may have been at least partly to blame for the incidence of
these laws which were instituted in Renaissance Britain in an attempt to prevent the
common classes from impersonating the nobility. See Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My
Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain—with an
Example From the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392,
1423 n.139 (1993). Pollack analogizes historical sumptuary laws to today’s protection of
proprietary rights under trademark law. Id. at 1422–28.
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primary sources of the United States constitutional tradition.138
A. The Constitutional Basis for Financial Privacy
The right in one’s own person or persona could be said to be the very
foundation of the political system of the United States.139 John Locke
expressed his concept of the inviolate self: “Though the earth, and all
inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in
his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself.”140 This right
most often is categorized as a right of privacy in the United States legal
tradition.141 However, the term “privacy” may be an unfortunate
nomenclature due to its common linkage with secrecy or facts that
should be kept hidden. The right of privacy in personal information
actually has very little to do with hiding things, but is instead about a
foundational right of inviolate personality and about the autonomy and
integrity that stems from that right.142 Laurence Tribe expressed this
concept as the “preservation of ‘those attributes of an individual which
are irreducible in his selfhood.’”143 The protection of the privacy right
finds its source in a constitutive right rooted in autonomy and the
protection of a zone of privacy that cannot be invaded by the outside
world without an individual’s express consent.144
The most obvious articulation of the protection of the zone of privacy
accorded to hearth and home is in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of
protection from unlawful search and seizure.145 A critical test of the
138. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
101–05, 183–87 (1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1310 &
n.16 (1988); cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“[A]
fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the
personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other.”).
139. See ALAN BRIAN CARTER, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS 13 (1989).
140. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 128 (Mark Goldie ed., J.M.
Dent 1993) (1690). Locke’s self-evident natural rights were not expressly incorporated
into the Constitution by its framers, but some have indicated that this omission was
merely because the founding fathers deemed these rights so obvious that they did not
consider them necessary to include. See TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1309–10. Early drafts
of the Bill of Rights did expressly incorporate natural rights into the Constitution. Id. at
1310 n.14.
141. See TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1302–08.
142. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 4.
143. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1304 (quoting Paul A. Freund, Address at the
American Law Institute 52nd Annual Meeting (May 23, 1975)).
144. Perhaps the best expression of this concept is crystallized in Justice Louis
Brandeis’s statement that privacy is simply “the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
145. U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
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scope of the Fourth Amendment came to pass with the Supreme Court’s
consideration of the case of Olmstead v. United States.146 Olmstead
revealed the Court’s struggle with information privacy issues inherent in
the impact on society of new telecommunication technologies as well as
with how the constitutional protections of human rights related to these new
technologies. Olmstead specifically concerned the issue of wiretapping and
whether the government’s interception of a telephone conversation
constituted an unlawful search and seizure. Unfortunately, instead of
adapting the spirit of the law to the challenges of new applications, the
Court retreated into formalism.147 Thus, the majority of the Court held
that because no physical entry of the house was necessary to accomplish
interception of a phone conversation, and because the information was
obtained by the sense of hearing and not by any actual physical entry,
wiretapping did not constitute any violation of the Fourth Amendment
guarantee against unlawful search and seizure.148 Justice Brandeis wrote
a seminal dissent,149 carrying with him Justices Holmes, Stone and
Butler. Brandeis expressed the importance of adapting the constitutional
guarantees to changing technology150 in prescient terms:
In the application of a constitution, therefore our contemplation cannot be
only of what has been but of what may be. . . .
. . . Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?151

Justice Brandeis went on to assert that the framers of the Constitution, in
recognition of man’s spiritual nature, feelings, and intellect, conferred
upon the citizens of the United States “the right to be let alone—the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.”152 Although formalism carried the day, the dissent carried history
violated.”).
146. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
147. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 338–39 (1967) (concluding that the
law did not catch up with the technological advances of the early twentieth century until
the late 1950s).
148. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466, overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
149. Id. at 471–85.
150. Id. at 473–79.
151. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 373 (1910)).
152. Id. at 478.
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as well as the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Later, in Katz
v. United States,153 the Warren Court overruled Olmstead and required
that government wiretaps meet the procedural requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, including the requirement for prior judicial
approval.154
However, since the Court’s general recognition in Katz of the
Constitution’s protection of a basic zone of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment,155 information privacy rights have undergone gradual
erosion. A major decision weakening the protection for information
privacy was United States v. Miller.156 In Miller, the Court held that an
individual has no legitimate “expectation of privacy” in the checks and
deposit slips that are disclosed to a bank in the course of the business
relationship. The Court further stated that these transaction records were
accorded no protection from search and seizure because they were
voluntarily disclosed, were negotiable instruments and thus not
confidential communications, and furthermore were deemed “the
business records of the bank.”157 The Court indicated, however, that the
requirement for disclosure to governmental authorities did not abrogate
the pre-existing duty of the bank to ensure that the customer’s financial
information will “be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the [bank] will not be betrayed.”158
A further dilution of the constitutional protection of information
privacy occurred with the Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland.159 In
Smith, the Court concluded that the police may utilize a pen register in
153. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
154. Id. at 358–59.
155. Id. at 351 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).
156. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
157. Id. at 440–43. Because Miller permitted unlimited government access to
financial records, Congress reacted by enacting the Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2000), to set limits on government’s free access. However, the
scope of the Act is limited to controlling the disclosure of a consumer’s financial
information to the federal government and does not establish any limits on disclosure to
private entities. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 262. The states are
therefore left with the responsibility to regulate any disclosures of financial information
to the private sector as well as to state and local governments. See L. RICHARD FISCHER,
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 5-2 (1983). However, a recent Supreme Court decision
indicates that Congress is vested with the primary responsibility to regulate data privacy
under the Commerce Clause. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (reasoning
that data is a thing in interstate commerce). Because most state constitutions roughly
parallel the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution with reference to search and
seizure jurisprudence, state constitutions generally protect only against disclosure of
personal information to governmental entities and do not concern themselves with
disclosure of personal financial information to the private sector. FISCHER, supra, at 5-3
to 5-7.
158. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. See also infra note 258.
159. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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recording calls made by an individual without invoking the Fourth
Amendment guarantees against search and seizure.160 The Court
reasoned that unlike the telephone conversation itself, which is accorded
Fourth Amendment protection, because the telephone numbers are
voluntarily disclosed to and recorded by the phone company for billing
purposes, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
numbers dialed.161 The Court further stated that the caller assumes the
risk that the telephone company will disclose this information to the
police.162 This decision effectively stands for the proposition that
consumers have no expectation of privacy from government intrusion
into their transaction data that is voluntarily disclosed in a commercial
transaction. Legal scholars have criticized the Court’s approach to data
privacy as not appreciating the potentially invasive uses to which
transaction data could be put.163 Whether the Court will modify its
position regarding a consumer’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his
or her transaction data in light of the increasingly invasive potential of
new technologies remains to be seen.164 But, under the current Fourth
160. Id. at 742.
161. Id. at 742–44.
162. Id. The Court’s conception of “assumption of risk” is based on the theory that
the consumer chooses to disclose information, and by this choice, forfeits any
expectation of privacy that may have existed in this information. Laurence Tribe called
this the “assumption of broadcast” notion and expressed the opinion that it is impossible
to say that one has “assumed” a risk of surveillance where one has no other choice but to
do so, based on the fact that it is not feasible to live without a telephone or a bank
account. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1391–92.
163. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1390–92. Tribe stated: “The Court’s
counter-intuitive understanding of ‘assumed risks’ generates a terribly crabbed sense of
the contemporary possibilities for privacy.” Id. at 1391.
164. A recent Supreme Court decision may indicate the Court’s willingness to
expand the reasonable expectation of privacy principle to cover information obtained by
new forms of invasive technology. In Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia expanded the
Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures to apply to
surveillance by means of infrared heat detection sensors. Overruling the lower court
decision that held that the defendant had not revealed any intimate details of the
plaintiffs home, the Court held that all details in the home are deemed intimate details.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). Moreover, the Court concluded that the
“homeowner [should not be left] at the mercy of advancing technology.” Id. at 35–36.
Although the real impact of Kyllo is still unclear, some have suggested that the decision
may bode well for such an expansion of the protection of information privacy against
invasions, public and private. See, e.g., William Safire, Privacy Still Under Attack, N.
COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), June 22, 2001, at A-14 (commenting on Kyllo: “The Supreme
Court’s reaffirmation of the individual’s right to privacy is heartening news to citizens who
want to maintain personal control of their medical, financial and academic records, their
buying habits, their genetic makeup and other intimate details of their lives.”).
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Amendment jurisprudence, the protection of information privacy against
government invasions remains somewhat anemic.
However, the true constitutional protections of information privacy as it
relates to computer profiling by governmental entities may arise not out of
the Fourth Amendment, but rather out of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
guarantee of due process. The Court’s approach to the issue of computer
profiling may be discerned from the opinion rendered in California Bankers
Ass’n v. Shultz.165 In California Bankers Ass’n, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 that required banks to
maintain certain records on their customers’ transactions, as well as to
report any transactions in currency that exceeded $10,000.166 The Court
upheld the Act without reaching any First, Fourth or Fifth Amendment
claims.167 However, the Court expressed in dicta that more difficult
constitutional questions would be raised in any information-gathering
program that expanded the scope of transaction data to include information
that would “reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and
beliefs.”168 The Court has given other indications that future technological
encroachments on privacy may be met with a more forcible constitutional
challenge, including questions of violations of due process rights. Justice
Brennan expressed this view in his dissent in Whalen v. Roe,169 where he
stated: “The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not
prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity
of some curb on such technology.”170
The Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest may also guarantee a right
of associational privacy and the inviolate right to “shape the ‘self’ that one
presents to the world, and on the basis of which the world in turn shapes
one’s existence.”171 This constitutive right was articulated by the Court in
165. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
166. Id. at 78.
167. Id. at 46–47.
168. Id. at 78–79 (Powell, J., concurring).
169. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
170. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). Laurence Tribe has also expressed the
potential of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide protection against invasive profiling
technologies as follows:
In an information-dense technological era, when living inevitably entails
leaving not just information footprints but parts of one’s self in myriad
directories, files, records and computers, to hold that the fourteenth
amendment does not reserve to individuals some power to say when and how
and by whom that information and those confidences are to be used would be
to denigrate the central role that information autonomy must play in any
developed concept of the self.
TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1400.
171. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1389–90; see also David H. Flaherty, On the Utility
of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protection, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831,
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Whalen v. Roe172 as the basic human right to withhold information that
one does not wish to share with others.173 The court expanded upon this
aspect of the liberty interest in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.174 In
Roberts, the Court indicated that the attributes surrounding intimate
associations—marriage, family, childbirth, and the raising and education
of children—are protected from intrusion as an element of personal
liberty.175 The Fourteenth Amendment may therefore afford some
protection against profiling activities that are found to implicate these
subjects.176
Although it is axiomatic that the Constitution applies solely with
respect to invasions to personhood by the government and not by the
private sector,177 the right of inviolate personality is still entitled to
recognition as a basic tenet of our constitutional system by virtue of the
states’ enforcement of individual rights under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.178 This implied constitutive right of privacy is evidenced
by the Court’s protection of harm to reputation under state law in the
face of a First Amendment challenge.179 Case law has further developed
this concept of linkage between the common law right of privacy and
839–41 (1991).
172. 429 U.S. 589 (1970).
173. Id. at 599–600. Laurence Tribe characterized this concept as one aspect of the
aspiration to be the “master of the identity one creates in the world.” TRIBE, supra note
138, at 1304.
174. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
175. Id. at 619–20; see also United States v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (finding an expectation of privacy in detailed
computerized records and stating that: “[B]oth the common law and the literal
understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning
his or her person”).
176. See Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Mass. 1987):
[I]t is not just the right to a silent, solitary autonomy which is threatened by
electronic surveillance: It is the right to bring thoughts and emotions forth from
the self in company with others doing likewise, the right to be known to others
and to know them, and thus to be whole as a free member of a free society.
177. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1306 (stating that governmental coercion
is accorded express constitutional limitations because it is viewed differently than the
“passive, incremental coercion that shapes all of life and for which no one bears precise
responsibility”).
178. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (“[T]he protection of a
person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual
States.”) (citations omitted); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (“The
protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the
individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.”).
179. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1396 n.42 (collecting cases).
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constitutional guarantees by grafting the Fourth Amendment “expectation
of privacy” principle onto the privacy intrusion torts.180 Because the
rights enforced by the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are
rooted in the basic constitutional protections, any strengthening or
expansion of a constitutional right in information privacy by the Court is
likely to produce an equivalent level of protection of information privacy
by the states with reference to private sector actions. Conversely, any
reticence by the Court to extend constitutional protection to information
privacy is likely to be reflected in the lower courts’ unwillingness to
extend similar protections in their interpretations of the common law and in
legislatures’ unwillingness to expand the statutory protection of information
privacy.181
B. The Legislative Basis for Financial Privacy
The United States was the birthplace of the Code of Fair Information
Practices182 that were later the basis for Organization for Economic
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (“One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”); see also Nader v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 773 (N.Y. 1970) (comparing the protections of the
Fourth Amendment to common law privacy torts); State v. Brooks, 601 A.2d 963, 969
(Vt. 1991) (comparing tort law privacy intrusion concepts to a search and seizure case).
See generally PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND METHODS, supra note 132, at 80–81 (1999)
(discussing the linkages between tort and constitutional protection for information
privacy).
181. Fred Cate, Director of the Information Law and Commerce Institute at the
Indiana University School of Law, insists that the Supreme Court is unlikely to support
the constitutionality of legislation requiring opt-in consent from consumers prior to use
of their personal transaction data because of “significant” First Amendment issues.
Senate Chairman Charts Legislation to Provide Privacy Opt-In, Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1921, at 1–2 (July 20, 2001). This viewpoint necessarily assumes a premise
that consumers have no underlying tort action based on a reasonable expectation of
privacy against the disclosure of that data to the private sector. Recognition of such an
underlying cause of action would possibly change the analysis. See U.S. West v. Fed.
Communications Comm’n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1245 (10th Cir. 1999) (“When the
fundamental right to privacy clashes with the right of free expression, the interest in
privacy does not play second fiddle when the speech is merely intended to propose a
commercial transaction.” (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Curtis v.
Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also infra note 305.
182. The Code of Fair Information Practices is based on the following five
principles:
(1) There must be no personal data-record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret.
(2) There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him
is in a record and how it is used.
(3) There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent.
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Cooperation and Development guidelines183 that have since been
codified in the European Commission Directive on Data Protection.184
However, in contrast to the welcome adoption of the Fair Information
Practices in Europe,185 the general U.S. legislative scheme for data
privacy rights does not conform uniformly to these guidelines.186
Instead of being unified under one data protection statute, information
privacy is protected in the U.S. by sectoral-specific statutes containing
inconsistent criteria for notice, choice, transparency, access, and security.187
Examples of this are the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998 (COPPA),188 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA),189 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,190
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,191 the Video Privacy Protection Act

(4) There must be away for an individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him.
(5) Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their
intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS xx-xxi (1973).
183. See Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, O.E.C.D. Doc. No
C(80)58 (final), 1981 I.L.M. 422 (Sept. 23, 1980).
184. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, T.S. No. 108, 1981 I.L.M. 317.
185. Simson Garfinkel theorizes that the reason the Health, Education and Welfare
report was adopted so readily in Europe during the 1970s was because of Europe’s desire
not to repeat their relatively recent experiences with Nazi Germany. See GARFINKEL,
supra note 4, at 7. Hitler’s schutzstaffel used data sourced from both the public and
private sectors to round up suspects for incarceration. Id.
186. For an analysis of the divergences between the U.S. protection of information
privacy and that codified under the European Directive, see generally SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 6.
187. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 100, at 201 (“In the United States, however,
no single source of privacy rights covers each data processing activity. Informational
privacy rights emerge from a complex web of federal and state laws that have responded
to narrowly identified problems.”).
188. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2000).
189. On December 28, 2000, the Department of Health and Human Services set
forth its final rule for standards for privacy of individually identifiable health
information, implementing certain provisions of Title II of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. The regulations are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§
160, 164 (2001).
190. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3121–3127 (2000).
191. 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2000).
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of 1980 (the “Bork Bill”)192 and the GLBA. There are many difficulties
with a sectoral approach. Although placing different rules for protection
of substantially similar data depending upon the industry sector of the
data collector probably would survive an equal protection challenge, this
approach may soon become unworkable and outmoded with the
increasing convergence of the telecommunications sector, both internally
and in combination with the financial services sector.193
But apart from mere inconsistency, the U.S. statutory framework
addressing information privacy lacks comprehensive force by focusing
primarily on the issue of disclosure to third parties instead of focusing on
the permissible uses of data.194 This differs fundamentally from the
information privacy laws in Europe that set defined use restrictions on
personal data and require the consumer’s express consent for any
processing activities outside of the purpose for which the data was
disclosed.195 As was suggested in Part II, intrusive invasions to privacy
192. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-209, approved Aug. 6,
2002). Under the Bork Bill, a consumer’s video viewing habits may not be disclosed
without his or her express consent. Id.; see also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note
6, at 314–15. The bill obtained its nickname from the circumstances surrounding the
unsuccessful nomination to the Supreme Court of Judge Robert Bork. In an attempt to
overturn Bork’s nomination, a Washington, D.C., newspaper journalist visited a local
video store Bork frequented hoping to find “dirt.” Instead of pornographic films, what
turned up were 146 videos consisting mostly of Disney movies and Hitchcock films. See
GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 72. But perhaps other members of Congress had more to
hide, as evidenced by their enthusiastic support of the opt-in provisions for information
sharing or disclosure under this bill.
193. The problems that are likely to arise with the convergence of the industry are
illustrated by the court’s interpretation of the Cable Act. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–559 (West,
WESTLAW through P.L. 107-209, approved Aug. 6, 2002). See, e.g., Parker v. Time
Warner Entm’t Co., No. 98 CV 4265 (ERK), 1999 WL 1132463 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,
1999). Citing the legislative history of the Cable Act, the Parker court held that if a
customer has not opted out of information disclosures, a cable operator is permitted to
disclose only “that an individual subscribes to services.” Id. at *9. The cable operator is
not permitted to “reveal the details of a particular transaction conducted over the cable
system (such as bank-at-home or shop-at-home transaction)” even if the customer has
not opted out. Id. However, under the GLBA, financial institutions are permitted to
disclose customer experience information to third parties if they have notified their
customers of this disclosure and the customer has not opted out of this disclosure.
Although this inconsistency between the Cable Act and the GLBA would not be likely to
invoke any equal protection issues (because these inconsistent regulations are arguably at
least minimally rational), this structure is likely to set up a possible legal quagmire in
determining which standard should apply if a financial holding company should ever
merge with a cable company. And, because the financial services industry is becoming
more and more reliant on telecommunications to compete in the information economy,
such a merger may not be unlikely.
194. For a review of data protection in the United States see generally, SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERG, supra note 6.
195. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 12–14. The major difference
between the European Union Convention and the United States’ data protection scheme
is that the European Union focuses on the permitted uses of data as well as disclosure,
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arising from computer profiling can take place without any actual
disclosure of data to third parties, and harm to a consumer may result
where a commercial entity internally uses a consumer’s profile to its
own benefit and to the consumer’s detriment. Thus, for legislation to be
truly protective of information privacy, it must not only address
disclosure, but must also set use restrictions precluding processing
activities that exceed the scope of the initial purpose for which the data
was disclosed or the scope of the consumer’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.196
Financial privacy in the United States is dealt with under two major
statutes:197 the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA),198 which
governs the reporting of consumer credit information, and the GLBA,
which sets forth the rules for information sharing between financial
holding companies and their affiliates and other third parties.
The purpose of the FCRA is to set forth guidelines and procedures for
consumer reporting agencies with regard to their preparation and
dissemination of consumer credit reports bearing on a consumer’s credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation,
personal characteristics, or mode of living, if that credit report is used or
collected to serve as a factor in determining the consumer’s eligibility
whereas the United States’ legislative scheme focuses solely on the disclosure of data.
For example, the UK Data Protection Act 1998 provides, in part, that an individual is
entitled to notify a data processor at any time to cease or not to begin processing any
personal data of the data subject if that processing is “likely to cause substantial damage
or substantial distress to him or to another, and . . . that damage or distress is or would be
unwarranted.”
Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 § 10 (Eng.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029—b.htm.
196. For a discussion of the ambit of the consumer’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, see infra notes 158–164, 256–70 and accompanying text.
197. Three other statutes impact financial privacy. The Electronic Funds Transfer
Act of 1978 establishes the guidelines for dealings between consumers and financial
institutions in connection with electronic fund transactions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r
(2000). Although the Act sets forth the requirements for collection of transaction data
and requires disclosures and the provision of account statements to consumers, it does
not restrict the uses of that data nor does it restrict the disclosure of that data to third
parties. See also Reidenberg, supra note 100, at 214. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
also regulates financial privacy, to the extent that it regulates the use of data by
prohibiting any use of information relating to sex, race, color, religion, national origin,
age, or marital status for purposes of making discriminatory credit decisions. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692b(2), 1692c(b) (2000). The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act regulates
disclosures of debtors’ financial information for debt collection purposes. 15 U.S.C. §
1691(a)(1) (2000). These statutes only tangentially relate to the practice of profiling and
thus are not discussed in detail herein.
198. 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2000).
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for household credit, insurance, or employment. The FCRA only relates
to disclosures of information by consumer reporting agencies and not to
disclosures of financial information by banks, insurance companies,
credit card companies, and the like.199 Unlike the other statutes addressing
financial privacy, the FCRA sets defined restrictions on permissible uses
of personal information. Under the FCRA, a consumer credit report may
be furnished by a consumer reporting agency to a third party only for
limited purposes.200 Any subsequent use by a recipient of a consumer
credit report is subject to strict guidelines for the use of that information
which must be in accordance with a permissible purpose defined under
the Act.201 But the standard of care that is required of the consumer
reporting agencies is to put in place “reasonable procedures”202 so that
consumer credit information is not disclosed for other than a permissible
purpose. The standard of care requires consumer reporting agencies to
do “what a reasonably prudent person would do under the circumstances.”203
Under the FCRA, consumers are neither provided with notice of the
collection and use of the data, nor are they provided with the opportunity
to opt-out of the consumer reporting agencies’ collection and use.204
199. A “consumer reporting agency” means “any person which . . . regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for
the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2000).
The term “consumer reporting agency” has been narrowly construed by the courts and as
such does not include banks, credit card companies, or other financial entities that collect
and disseminate information based solely on their own experiences with a consumer.
See, e.g., Lema v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 935 F. Supp. 695, 697 (D. Md. 1996); Freeman
v. S. Nat’l Bank, 531 F. Supp. 94, 95–96 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Nikou v. INB Nat’l Bank,
638 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
200. These purposes are: (1) in response to a court order, (2) in accordance with the
consumer’s written instructions, or (3) to a person which it has reason to believe intends
to use it: (i) in a credit transaction involving the consumer, (ii) for employment purposes,
(iii) for the underwriting of insurance, (iv) for determination of eligibility for a license or
other benefit of a governmental instrumentality, (v) as a potential investor or servicer, or
current insurer or risk assessment of an existing credit obligation, or (vi) otherwise has a
legitimate business need for the information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a) (2000). However,
the credit reporting agency is not subject to strict liability for failure to limit the
furnishing of consumer reports to the permissible purposes. Spence v. TRW, Inc., 92
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1996). The courts balance the potential harm of inaccuracy
against the burden on the agency of safeguarding against such inaccuracy. Houston v.
TRW Info. Servs, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 689, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(e) (2000).
202. Id. § 1681e(a). These reasonable procedures consist of requiring that users of
the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is
sought and to certify that it will be used for no other purpose. Id.
203. Dobson v. Holloway, 828 F. Supp. 975, 977 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
204. A consumer is, however, able to opt-out of the so-called prescreening practices
of the consumer reporting agencies. The Act provides that a consumer reporting agency
may furnish a consumer report to a third party that is not initiated by the consumer if the
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Moreover, the FCRA does not provide for strict liability for errors
contained in a consumer credit report, but merely imposes a duty of
reasonable care.205 The FCRA does, however, provide the consumer
with the opportunity to review his or her credit report and to correct any
inaccurate information.206 The FCRA generally preempts any common
law claims sounding in defamation, invasion of privacy or negligence,
and provides qualified immunity for the consumer reporting agencies
except where the agency furnishes false information with malice or
willful intent to injure the consumer.207
Thus, the FCRA gives consumers very limited rights pertaining to
limiting profiling activities of their transaction information. First,
although the FCRA requires a consumer credit reporting agency to
disclose the contents of a credit report to a consumer, the FCRA does not
require disclosure to the consumer of the score that is generated by the
agency’s computer model or of the criteria that the agency uses to arrive
at that score.208 Second, the broadly-stated language of the FCRA
establishing a permissible use for any “legitimate business need” has
permitted the consumer reporting agencies, as well as recipients of the

transaction consists of a “firm offer of credit or insurance.” 15 U.S.C. §
1681b(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000). A consumer may, however, opt-out of these disclosures by
notifying the credit reporting agency that they do not consent to such disclosures to third
parties. Id. § 1681b(e). Recently, the major consumer reporting agencies have
established a central toll-free number that consumers may call to opt-out of these
disclosures: 1.888.5OPTOUT. See BANK OF AM. CORP., BANK OF AMERICA PRIVACY
POLICY FOR CONSUMERS: HOW WE PROTECT AND USE INFORMATION (2001).
205. See Spence, 92 F.3d 380 at 383.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2001).
207. 15 U.S.C § 1681h (2001). The FTC is given the power to enforce the FCRA
under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), id. § 41, and any violation of the
FCRA will be deemed an unfair and deceptive act under the FTC Act. Id. § 1681s. A
private individual does not have the right to act as a private attorney general in enforcing
the FCRA. See Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64 F.R.D. 660, 668 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
208. The score is most often generated by a modeling technology licensed from
Fair, Isaac and Company (FICO). FICO has guarded the score as its proprietary
information and only recently has provided customers the opportunity to obtain a copy of
their score. See Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc., myFICO—Your Source For Credit
Scoring, at http://www.myfico.com (last visited May 24, 2002). FICO will provide a
copy of your score for a fee, currently $12.95. Id. FICO’s scoring methodology itself is
not publicly available, but FTC materials indicate that some factors included in the score
are age, income, residential status (own or rent), income, and debt ratio. See Fair, Isaac
and Company, Credit Scoring 101, Presentation to the Federal Trade Commission
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/creditscoring/present/sld001.htm, at slide 7 (July 22,
1999).
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report, broad latitude in their use of personal financial information.209
In fact, the FCRA sets forth as one of its core purposes the maintenance
and protection of the “elaborate mechanism [that] has been developed
for investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers.”210 In
essence, the FCRA legitimizes and regulates profiling activities with
reference to the consumer reporting industry. But because of its limited
applicability to credit reporting agencies, it has no effect on and does not
regulate the elaborate mechanisms for scoring consumer risk and
behavior that have now spread to the balance of the financial services
industry.211
The Federal Financial Modernization Act, commonly known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed by Congress and signed
into law by the President in November 1999. The purpose of the GLBA
was “to enhance competition in the financial services industry by
providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities
firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers.”212 At
the same time, Congress recognized the increased vulnerability of consumers
to the dissemination of their personal financial information that such a
structure would permit.213 Thus, Congress enacted Title V of the Act for
purpose of ensuring that “each financial institution ha[ve] an affirmative
and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to
protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic
209. However, the D.C. Circuit has recently upheld the FTC’s interpretation that a
targeted marketing list generated by a consumer reporting agency is included in the
ambit of a “consumer report” under the FCRA and that targeted marketing was not a
permissible purpose under the Act. Trans Union Corp. v. F.T.C., 245 F.3d 809, 812, 819
(D.C. Cir. 2001), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 2386 (2002).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2) (2000). This elaborate mechanism was found by
Congress to be critical to the continued health of the banking system. Id. § 1681(a)(1).
211. In fact, a recent decision limiting the ability of the credit reporting agencies to
disclose personally identifiable financial information to direct marketers may forge a
new alliance between the financial services industry (which is not generally subject to
the FCRA strictures) and the direct marketing association for purposes of the profiling of
consumer transaction information. See Individual Reference Servs. Group v. F.T.C., 145
F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42 (2002). In
Individual Reference Services Group, the district court upheld an FTC regulation that
prevented the credit reporting agencies from distributing credit header, tradeline, or
aggregate data obtained from financial institutions. The appeals court upheld the district
court decision, but refused to rule on the permissible uses of data aggregated by the
CRAs, stating that the issue was “not yet ripe” because the FTC had “not determined
whether or to what extent aggregation should be considered ‘use’” under the applicable
FTC regulation. Trans Union LLC, 296 F.3d at 51. This decision effectively places the
FTC in the crucial role of defining (or perhaps of declining to define) the parameters for
data aggregation and profiling of financial information permitted under the GLBA.
212. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-434, at 245–46 (1999).
213. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 98 (1999).
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personal information.”214 Under the Act, the regulators are given discretion
to establish standards for financial institutions in the protection of the
security and confidentiality of customer records and information.215
These include (1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer
records and information, (2) to protect against any anticipated threats or
hazards to the security or integrity of such records, and (3) to protect
against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.216
The GLBA extends its authority over “financial institutions,” which are
defined broadly as “any institution the business of which is engaging in
financial activities as described in Section 1843(k) of title 12.”217
Although the GLBA sets forth as one of its core purposes the
prevention of the unauthorized use of personal financial information
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any
customer,218 the Act fails to set any express use restrictions on
information and instead codifies a mechanism for permissible
disclosures to third parties. The GLBA prohibits financial institutions
from disclosing to nonaffiliated third parties any nonpublic personal
information, unless that consumer has first been provided with a notice
that permits the consumer to opt-out of those disclosures.219 A financial
institution must “clearly and conspicuous[ly]”220 disclose to a consumer its
practices with regard to (1) disclosure of nonpublic personal information to
affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties, (2) disclosure of nonpublic
personal information of persons who have ceased to be its customers,
and (3) its measures to protect a consumer’s nonpublic personal
214. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000).
215. Id. § 6802.
216. Id.
217. Id. § 6809(3)(A).
218. See, e.g., Joan P. Warrington, Synopsis of S. 900 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Title V—Privacy, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: FINANCIAL SERVICES
MODERNIZATION (2000), available at LEXIS SEA1 ALI-ABA 213, 215 (“This broad
language could be construed by regulators to allow issuance of regulations much broader
than the statutory language. Certainly, the concept of customer ‘inconvenience’ is a
troublesome standard, one that could be exploited by class action lawyers. For example,
telemarketing and spam could be considered inconveniences.”).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2000).
220. Some have suggested that the notices sent by financial institutions were far
from clear or conspicuous. See Confusing Privacy Notices Leave Consumers Exposed,
USA TODAY, July 9, 2001, at 13A. An ABA survey indicated that forty-one percent of
respondents could not recall receiving the prescribed privacy notices. Id. Perhaps as a
result, less than one percent of consumers have opted-out of information sharing. Id.
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information.221
However, under the GLBA a consumer is not
empowered to prevent a financial institution’s disclosure of his or her
nonpublic personal information to its affiliates.222 Nor may a consumer
prohibit a financial institution from sharing such information with “a
nonaffiliated third party . . . perform[ing] services for or functions on
behalf of the financial institution, including marketing of the financial
institution’s own products or services, or financial products or services
offered pursuant to joint agreements between two or more financial
institutions,”223 provided that the financial institution “fully discloses” this
type of activity to the consumer.224
Thus, the GLBA does not provide a consumer with any substantive
protection against the profiling of his or her financial information. First,
although the GLBA does permit a consumer to prevent the sharing of his
or her personal financial information with nonaffiliated third parties, the
Act provides no protection whatsoever against the sharing of a
consumer’s financial information with the financial institution’s affiliates or
by the financial institution’s marketing partners.225 In addition, the
exception for disclosure to affiliates provides a very broad carve out to
the Act’s limits on disclosure to third parties. And, the permitted
disclosures to financial institutions under joint marketing agreements
have been described by some as including “everything but the kitchen
sink” because of the expansive definition of the term “financial
institution” under the Act.226
221. 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2000).
222. Id. § 6802(b)(2) (2000).
223. The exception for marketing partners was a last-minute addition to the
legislation, without a full conference committee debate, at the behest of industry
lobbyists such as GE Capital Services, Inc. See Michael Schroeder, Late Requests for
Favors and Fixes Precede Votes on Landmark Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at
A2. Some have suggested that this exception, as well as the exception for affiliates,
negates any real privacy protection under the bill. William Raspberry, Privacy: The
Horse Has Left the Barn, WASH. POST, June 25, 2001, at A15, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/opinion/A41200-2001Jun24.html.
224. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2). The method, frequency and standard for “fully
discloses” is not defined in the Act.
225. The potential scope of disclosures to affiliates is illustrated by several of the
recent mergers that have resulted from the liberalization of the banking industry: the
creation of Citigroup by the merger of Citicorp and Travelers; Royal Bank of Canada’s
acquisition of the life insurance subsidiaries of Liberty Corporation, Dexia’s acquisition
of Financial Security Assurance and MetLife, Inc.’s, acquisition of Grand Bank N.A. of
Kingston, N.J. See Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr. et al., Financial Services Reform: The New
Business of Banking and Insurance Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 2001 PRACTISING L.
INST., GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY UPDATE 121, 123–24.
226. Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and
the Constitutionality of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 163,
193 (2001) (explaining that a financial institution includes “any institution that engages
in activities that are financial in nature, incidental to such financial activity or
complementary to a financial activity”).
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Second, the Act gives consumers no knowledge or control over the
uses of their nonpublic personal information by the financial institution,
by the financial institution’s affiliates, by the financial institution’s
marketing partners, or (if they failed to opt-out) by nonaffiliated third
parties. In addition, the annual notices that a financial institution is
required to send to a consumer must only describe the financial
institution’s practices concerning the disclosure and security procedures
in regard to the nonpublic personal information, not the uses to which
this information may be put. In fact, at least one bank that formerly did
provide its customers with notice of its profiling practices has now
deleted that information from its privacy policy with the enactment of
the GLBA.227
Third, the likely effect of the GLBA will be to increase the incidence
of profiling. Your bank now may become a financial holding company,
and may act as banker, insurance provider, realtor, and stock broker.
The resulting scope and breadth of the data aggregations that are thus
created may open the floodgates to data sharing and data profiling.
Under the GLBA, consumers who fail to opt-out may be assumed to
have waived any express or implied restrictions on disclosure of their
financial information to third parties.228 The wealth of personal financial
data thus available for marketing purposes, combined with the effect of
recent case law decisions limiting such uses by the credit reporting
agencies,229 may have the effect of forging a stronger alliance between
227. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Ms. Culnan). Mary
Culnan, Slade Professor of Management and Information Technology at Bentley College
in Waltham, Massachusetts, conducts research on information privacy. She made the
following remarks at the FTC’s Public Workshop on the Information Marketplace:
[T]here was one excellent financial services notice about enhancement that
basically said, [“]We do profiling, we do data mining, we acquire third-party
data, non credit report data, to understand how you use our card and we use
this to serve you better,[”] and they had an opt-out form right with the
notice, and you could mail that back or call the 800 number. Unfortunately,
with the Gramm[-]Leach[-]Bliley requirement, that doesn’t cause companies
to have to specify how they’re going to use information, just what they
collect and who they disclose it to. That very nice statement disappeared
from the Gramm[-]Leach[-]Bliley notice that this company has sent out,
which is now their de facto privacy notice.
Id. (emphasis added).
228. But see infra Part V.C.
229. See generally Individual Reference Servs. Group v. F.T.C., 145 F. Supp. 2d 6,
32 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42 (2002) (holding that
consumer reporting agencies are precluded from disclosing their “credit header”
information on consumers to third parties without abiding by the notice provisions of the
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financial institutions and the direct marketing industry.
The GLBA allows the states to craft greater protection for nonpublic
personal information under state legislation, except to the extent of any
inconsistency with the GLBA. The Act expressly explains that a state
law is not deemed inconsistent with the GLBA if the law provides
protection greater than that provided under the Act.230 Bills have been
introduced into Congress to modify the GLBA to eliminate the exception
for information sharing among affiliates and to require opt-in prior to
any information sharing. However, intense industry lobbying activities
at the state and federal level indicate that it will be extraordinarily
difficult to establish legislation providing any greater protection for
nonpublic financial information than that which currently exists under
the GLBA.231
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: A COMMON LAW SOLUTION
“Law never is, but is always about to be.”232
In light of the paucity of constitutional and legislative protections
against invasions of information privacy by the private sector, is there a
common law right that will afford a solution? Prior to his tenure on the
Supreme Court, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote a law review article in
conjunction with his friend from Harvard Law School, Samuel Warren,
entitled, “The Right to Privacy.”233 This law review article was destined
GLBA). Thus, financial institutions are likely to become the data vendor of choice for
the Direct Marketing Association. Because the consumer reporting agencies do not have
direct relationships with individual consumers, the ruling effectively precludes the
agencies’ sale of this data to marketers. And obtaining consumer financial data from
financial holding companies rather than credit reporting agencies obviates the necessity
of abiding by the fair information practices that restrict the permitted uses of credit data
under the FCRA. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
230. 15 U.S.C. § 6807 (2000).
231. Rachel Zimmerman & Glenn R. Simpson, Lobbyists Swarm to Stop Tough
Privacy Bills in States, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2000, at A16; Robert Salladay, Davis May
Weaken Privacy Measure, N. COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), Aug. 3, 2001, at A-3;
Editorial, Davis Stands Privacy Bill on Its Head, N. COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), Aug.
31, 2001, at A-18.
232. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Method of Sociology, The Judge as Legislator,
Address Before the Law School of Yale University (1921), in THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 98, 126 (1921).
233. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 193 (articulating some of the same
concepts that were later repeated in Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent). The similarities
between the language of the law review article, which concerned itself with the civil
protections of the right to privacy, and the Olmstead dissent, which related to the
constitutional right to privacy, would indicate that Brandeis saw a theoretical link
between the common law right to privacy and the constitutional protection of the
liberties of man against government oppression. “The common law has always
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to become known as the “outstanding example of the influence of legal
periodicals upon the American law.”234 The Right to Privacy leads off
with the assertion that the “recognition of man’s spiritual nature, of his
feelings and his intellect” have broadened the natural rights of man to
include the “right to be let alone.”235 The article went on to trace the
development of the civil protection of this right through the tort actions
of battery, assault, nuisance, slander and libel, the protection of
intellectual property, and finally to the fullest and highest expression of
this liberty right which is found in the law’s protection of the right to
privacy.236 Some have characterized the Warren and Brandeis law
review article as a response to the yellow journalism and “kodakers”
found in Boston of the late 1800s.237 However, a reading of the close
parallels of the law review article to Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent may
indicate that the article was not a statement about the overreaching of the
press,238 but rather it was an expression of Brandeis’ prescient concern
over the invasive potential of technology and the importance of the
growth of the law to “defin[e] anew the exact nature and extent of [full
protection of the individual in person and in property] in light of that
invasiveness.”239
recognized a man’s house as his castle . . . [s]hall the courts thus close the front entrance
to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?” Id. at
220.
234. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960).
235. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 193.
236. Id. at 193–95.
237. See, e.g., ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 338 (1967) (referring to use
of the “instantaneous photography” perfected by Kodak in the late 1880s). Following
this line of reasoning, Dean William Prosser wrote that the article was penned as a
response to Samuel Warren’s annoyance at the invasive behavior of the press at the
wedding of Warren’s daughter. Prosser, supra note 234, at 383. Prosser surmises that
“she must have been a very beautiful girl. . . . This was the face that launched a thousand
lawsuits.” Id. at 423. Although great prose, Prosser’s tale may be apocryphal. Warren
married in 1883 and Warren’s daughter was only six years old in 1890 when the article
was published. See LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 35 (1983). In addition, modern
researchers have found scant evidence of an abusive form of journalism in Boston in the
1890s. Id.
238. In fact, the article goes to great lengths to set forth the applicable limits to the
right of privacy that protect the First Amendment rights of the press for matters of public
or general interest, establish privileged communications, and set forth protection for oral
publications. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 214–17.
239. Id. The article expressly mentioned concern over the protection of the “right to
be let alone,” in view of “recent inventions and business methods,” “mechanical
devices,” and “instantaneous photographs,” along with the “intensity and complexity of
life” brought on by “modern enterprise and invention.” Id. at 195–96. These concerns
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The New York Court of Appeals was one of the first courts to deal
with the privacy gauntlet that Warren and Brandeis had thrown down in
The Right to Privacy. And the court’s swift response was to reject the
right of privacy in its entirety.240 The court explained its reasoning to
the effect that the introduction of such a right would usher in vast
amounts of litigation and it would be impossible to demarcate the line
between a plaintiff’s right of privacy and the rights of others.241 The
response of the legal community to this decision was generally that of
regret.242 Three years later, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.,243 the Georgia Supreme Court criticized the New York decision in a
about modern technology are echoed in Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent. Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–78 (1927). Indeed, one biographer of Louis Brandeis
reports that the fervor of Brandeis’s dissent may have been driven at least in part by his
concern over General Electric Corporation’s RCA subsidiary’s development of
television and its potential for government surveillance uses. An early draft of
Brandeis’s dissent read that: “Through television, radium and photography, ways may
soon be developed by which the Government can, without removing papers from secret
drawers, reproduce them in court.” PAPER, supra note 237, at 312. The Warren Court
later vindicated many of the views Brandeis set forth in the Olmstead dissent. See supra
notes 152–153 and accompanying text. However, the Supreme Court, by its failure to
give express protection against the invasiveness of modern profiling technologies, has
not yet given full vindication to Brandeis’s views that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
should protect against “[a]dvances in the psychic and related sciences [that] may bring
means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
474.
240. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447–48 (N.Y. 1902). In
Roberson, a woman sued to recover for damages caused by humiliation and sickness on
account of a flour milling company’s reproduction of her image, without her consent, on
its boxes of flour next to the advertising slogan, “the flour of the family.” Id. at 442.
The trial court had held that the woman had a right of property in her own self, and thus
denied the defendant’s demurrer. Id. at 442. The defendant appealed and the New York
Court of Appeals, in a four-to-three decision, reversed, holding that there was no right of
privacy as a matter of law. Id. at 447–48.
241. Id. at 443. Some have traced New York Supreme Court Chief Justice Parker’s
reticence to accord protection to the right of privacy to the fact that he subscribed to the
theory of legal positivism that “views ‘law’ as consisting solely of an objectively
determined body of enactments, principles, doctrines and rules which are fixed in
advance of litigation.” PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND METHODS, supra note 132, at 54–55.
242. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co, 50 S.E. 68, 79 (Ga. 1905) (listing
critical law review articles). An editorial in the American Law Review offered the
opinion that the decision “shocks and wounds the ordinary sense of justice of mankind.”
Right to Privacy: Injunction Denied a Young Woman to Restrain the Publication of Her
Portrait on Commercial Packages for the Purpose of Advertising, 36 ALR 614, 636
(1905). The New York legislature quickly responded to the decision by enacting
Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Act which provided a statutory cause
of action for invasion of privacy. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2001).
Section 50 reads as follows: “A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person . . . is guilty of a
misdemeanor.” Id. § 50.
243. 50 S.E. at 68. In Pavesich, an insurance company had used plaintiff’s
photograph in an advertisement for insurance containing a false statement of plaintiff’s
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similar fact situation in which a photograph of the plaintiff was used to
market a life insurance product. The court penned an elaborate opinion
tracing the history of privacy from early civilization as justification for
the rationale that privacy was a natural right of man. Justice Cobb
depicted the right of privacy as rooted in the liberty interest to be free
from commercial exploitation as follows:
The knowledge that one’s features and form are being used for such a
purpose . . . brings . . . the person . . . to a realization that his liberty has been
taken away from him . . . he is no longer free, and . . . he is, in reality a slave
without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master.244

The Pavesich decision gave common law legitimacy to the right of
privacy introduced by Warren and Brandeis, and other courts generally
followed the decision.245
More than fifty years later, Dean Prosser took a look at the legal
landscape of privacy and compared it to “a haystack in a hurricane”246
due to the utter disarray and confusion in the law. So Prosser set forth to
codify the right of privacy into four causes of action which, although
dissimilar in the scope of circumstances they covered, had as their
unifying principle that “each represents an interference with the right of
the plaintiff . . . ‘to be let alone.’”247 Prosser delineated these four torts
as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs;
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff;
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye; and

endorsement of defendant’s life insurance products that was published in the Atlanta
Constitution. Id. at 68. The plaintiff sued on the right of privacy, alleging that the
statement attributed to him was offensive. Id. at 69. While the dissent in Roberson
unsuccessfully relied on Lockean property rights to justify a right of privacy, Roberson,
64 N.E. at 448–51, Justice Cobb in Pavesich, while relying in part on Judge Grey’s
Roberson dissent, instead relied on a natural rights theory. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73–74.
244. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80.
245. For the historical listing of cases and statutes recognizing the right of privacy
after the Pavesich decision, see Prosser, supra note 234, at 386–88 nn.17–58.
246. Prosser, supra note 234, at 407 (quoting Biggs, J., in Ettore v. Philco
Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956)).
247. Prosser, supra note 234, at 389 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
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Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the
plaintiff’s name or likeness248

Prosser’s theory of the four-fold manifestation of the tort received
some initial disagreement.249 But eventually Prosser’s analysis prevailed
as the general standard, receiving codification in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts250 and, as such, serves as the basis for most states’
common law privacy doctrines. Of these categories, the intrusion on
seclusion and the appropriation torts may provide protection against
profiling.
A. Intrusion on Seclusion
The tort of intrusion on seclusion occurs when “[o]ne . . . intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”251 This form of invasion of
privacy focuses on the manner in which the information is obtained and
implicates the “use of the defendant’s senses, with or without
mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs.”252
The tort therefore does not require any actual disclosure of the
information to a third party to be actionable.253 Public information is not
protected under the tort, and the intrusion must therefore invade the zone
of “private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or
affairs.”254 The crux of the tort is that the intrusion must be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. And the standard for “highly offensive”
turns on whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy
against that intrusion.255
Because the intrusion must abrogate the plaintiff’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, is the applicability of the intrusion tort to
disclosures of financial information to the private sector therefore
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Hyman Gross, The Concept of
Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34 (1967); see also infra notes 278–281 and accompanying
text.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
251. Id. § 652B.
252. Id. at cmt. b. The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the following as
examples of actionable behavior: opening a person’s mail, searching a person’s wallet,
and viewing his private bank account. Id. (emphasis added).
253. See Id. at cmt. a.
254. Id. at cmt. c.
255. See White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 91–92 (N.J. 2001) (reasoning that the
definition of what is highly offensive to a reasonable person turns on one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, which is measured objectively).
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hampered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller? Because the
Court in Miller held that a bank customer has “no expectation of
privacy” against disclosure of his financial information to governmental
authorities,256 some have generalized this principle and have concluded
that a consumer also has no reasonable expectation of privacy against
disclosure of his or her financial information to a private sector actor.257
But, in fact, the Court in Miller was careful to distinguish the Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy (that is, where financial records are
provided to the government under a subpoena duces tecum) from a
situation where a consumer’s financial records are disclosed to the
private sector.258
Some have also taken the holding in Miller to stand for the principle
that an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in business
records that have been voluntarily conveyed to the bank and have thus
become the bank’s property.259 According to this line of reasoning, the
256. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–45 (1976).
257. See FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-8 (suggesting that the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in financial data precludes any liability under the intrusion tort
unless the financial institution acts in an unreasonable or outrageous manner). A senior
bank official at a large credit card company stated that information sharing by banks with
third parties has “long been a standard industry practice” and is given endorsement by
federal regulators as being “a reasonable part of commerce.” See Lisa Fickenscher,
Chase Pact in N.Y. Shows How States Could Set Privacy Rules, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27,
2000, at 1.
258. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff did
not have a constitutionally protected zone of privacy in financial records). The Court’s
holding was quite narrow and limited any disclosure to the context of a narrowly-focused
subpoena duces tecum, which was therefore subject to the accordant legal restraints. The
Court distinguished its holding from a fact pattern implicating a “wide-ranging inquiry
that ‘unnecessarily touches upon intimate areas of an individual’s personal affairs.’” Id.
at 444–45 n.6 (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974)).
Notwithstanding the absence of a constitutionally protected zone of privacy in financial
information, the Court acknowledged the duty that is incumbent upon a financial
institution to protect this information from disclosure to the private sector:
This court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.
Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
259. See, e.g., CATE, supra note 9, at 15 (citing Miller for the proposition that it is
“fundamentally unfair [to prohibit] financial institutions from using . . . information that
they have spent millions of dollars collecting and in which they have a legally
recognized property interest”). A. Michael Froomkin called this phenomenon the “joint
and several ownership of the facts of a transaction.” Froomkin, supra note 121, at 1502.
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bank is free to do whatever it wants with any personal financial
information in its possession. The Indiana Court of Appeals recently
was asked to review the reductio ad absurdum of this syllogism—in a
slightly different context—and rejected it in its entirety with the
following statement:
It does not follow that one gives up all expectations of privacy and therefore,
waives all [privacy] claims . . . when voluntarily revealing one’s affairs to a
third party. . . . [T]o the extent that our [prior holding] . . . may be read to align
fourth amendment expectation of privacy analysis with the tort of invasion of
privacy in general, we disaffirm such a reading.260

The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy against
disclosure to the private sector is also substantiated by holdings in
actions arising out of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).261 In the
context of the government’s disclosure of an individual’s personal
information to the private sector, the federal courts have found a
reasonable expectation of privacy in names and addresses,262 in information
concerning private activities, and in activities taking place in the
home.263 Furthermore, in this context, at least one court has found a
significant privacy interest in financial information that is combined
with names and addresses.264
The reasonable expectation of privacy in financial information is
further demonstrated by the protection accorded to financial information
under the breach of confidence tort.265 The duty of confidentiality is
based on precedent found in English common law.266 Many state courts
have adopted the English precedent and accord a duty of confidentiality
towards any information learned “in the character of a banker.”267 Such
260. Pohle v. Cheatham, 724 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In Pohle,
Cheatham had taken compromising pictures of his ex-wife with her permission. Id. at
657. The pictures were deemed Cheatham’s property by virtue of the divorce decree. Id.
Cheatham then proceeded to post these pictures in conspicuous places around town. Id.
at 657. Pohle sued, premised on a public disclosure of private facts cause of action. Id.
at 657–58. Cheatham raised the defense of waiver, relying on Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, arguing that because the plaintiff had voluntarily “taken the risk in
revealing [her] affairs to third parties that the information will be conveyed by that
person to law enforcement officials” she therefore had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the photographs. Id. at 660. The court held for the plaintiff. Id. at 661.
261. 5 U.S.C § 552 (2000).
262. HMG Mktg. Assoc. v. Freeman, 523 F. Supp. 11, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
263. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1974).
264. Aronson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 822 F.2d 182, 186 (1st Cir.
1987).
265. For a discussion of the breach of confidence tort see, Susan M. Gilles,
Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence As a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 57 n.250 (collecting cases).
266. Tournier v. Nat’l Provincial & Union Bank of Eng., 1 K.B. 461 (Eng. C.A.
1924).
267. See McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa. 1998). For states adopting
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information must not be disclosed to third parties, except under
compulsion of law, for prevention of crime or fraud against the bank or a
third party, or with the implied or express consent of the customer.268
Judicial precedents are not in accord as to the source of the duty of
confidentiality, but some trace its basis in the right of privacy.269 One
court expressed the parallel between the duty of confidentiality and the
reasonable expectation of privacy as: “A bank customer’s reasonable
expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he
reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking
purposes.”270
Furthermore, the second branch of the tort is satisfied by the fact that
intrusion into personal financial affairs by a third party is highly
offensive to a reasonable person.271 Profiling is especially intrusive, and
can reveal intimate details of a person’s activities, associations, and
beliefs. Profiling therefore could easily be found to intrude into the zone
of seclusion that a person throws about his affairs.272 Because the
reasonable expectation of privacy is often defined with reference to
general social norms,273 the high incidence of consumer discomfort with
financial profiling274 further demonstrates the strength of the reasonable
the Tournier doctrine, see FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-10 to 5-16.
268. See generally FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-10 to 5-16. Fischer observes that
the Tournier doctrine is basically identical to the scope of consumer privacy outlined by
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c)–(d) (2000). FISCHER,
supra note 157, at 5-11.
269. See, e.g., McGuire, 722 A.2d at 1091 (“It is an implied term of the contract
between the banker and his customer that the banker will not divulge to third persons,
without the consent of the customer, express or implied, either the state of the customer’s
account or any of his transactions with the bank, or any information relating to the
customer acquired through the keeping of his account.” (quoting Peterson v. Idaho First
Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961)); see also DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF
PRIVACY 370 (1991 & Supp. May 2001) (implied contract). FISCHER, supra note 157, at
5-15 (implied contract). But there is considerable legal confusion over the source of this
duty and whether it actually arises in tort. See Giles, supra note 128, at 18 n.86 & 55 nn.
245–51 (collecting cases).
270. Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974) (emphasis added).
271. McGuire, 722 A.2d at 1092.
272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977). This may be
analogized to the Supreme Court’s protection of a zone of privacy in intimate
associations from state intrusion under the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes
165–76 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 802–03 (N.J. 1990).
274. Statistics reveal that at least ninety-five percent of people questioned would be
either not very comfortable or not at all comfortable with the creation of a profile that
contained their financial data. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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expectation of privacy in financial information.
Therefore, the intrusion on seclusion tort is likely to provide a basis of
relief against intrusive computer profiling activities in the financial
services industry. However, in alignment with the parameters of the
duty of confidentiality, the tort would not be implicated where the
financial institution used the consumer’s information for internal
banking purposes incident to the normal course of a business transaction.
Liability under the tort would probably be limited to situations where
information is collected in an unreasonably intrusive manner or when the
consumer’s profile is used to facilitate offensive marketing or
discriminatory scoring activities.
B. The Appropriation Privacy Tort
The appropriation privacy tort may also provide a basis to prevent
profiling activities by effectively setting restrictions on the permissible
uses of personal financial information. As the appropriation tort is set
out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the cause of action presents the
following deceptively simple formulation: “One who appropriates to his
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy.”275 In order to determine if the
appropriation privacy tort can afford a remedy against computer
profiling, the following four questions must be answered: (1) what is the
nature of the interest protected, (2) what are the aspects of identity, (3)
how is the interest invaded, and (4) what constitutes an “appropriation”
for purposes of the tort?
1. The Nature of the Interest Protected: A Right Just for Blondes,
“Kings,” and Legends, or a Right for the Rest of Us?
As expressed in Part III of this Comment, information privacy is
unlikely to be accorded any real protection by virtue of consumers being
assigned property rights in their transaction data. For this reason, many
who have looked at the possible applicability of the appropriation
privacy tort for solving issues of information privacy have concluded
that it was unsuitable for this application by virtue of the fact that it was
inherently a property right.276 This Part seeks to demonstrate that the
appropriation privacy tort is in fact not a property right that capitalizes
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
276. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 74, at 778–79 (“The misappropriation tort
safeguards the monetary value of the kind of self-revelation that our culture associates
with celebrity status. . . . But the misappropriation tort will not establish constitutive
privacy’s domains of access and non-access to information.”).
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on a person’s ability to recover from the “user’s failure to pay” for the
use of his or her likeness, but rather is a personal right rooted in the
injury to sensibilities that occurs with the shock of confronting the
commercialization of one’s own self.277
The early disagreement over Prosser’s codification of the right to
privacy arose out of some legal scholars’ concern with Prosser’s implication
of a “proprietary” interest278 as the rationale for the appropriation tort, as
277. See James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 641 (1973). It should probably be noted at this
point that Thomas J. McCarthy cautions against the use of the labels of “personal rights”
and “property rights” to describe the appropriation privacy and right of publicity torts,
respectively, because these attributions flow from and do not create the difference
between the right of privacy and the right of publicity. McCarthy stresses that the crucial
difference between the rights is the nature of the right invaded. In Mr. McCarthy’s
words, the right of publicity protects the pocketbook, and the right of privacy protects the
psyche. Once this distinction is understood, Mr. McCarthy advises that the labels of
property versus personal rights may follow without the danger of having us march “lockstep into any preconceived result.” 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY § 5:65, at 5-121 (2d ed. 2001).
278. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 854 (W. Page Keeton gen. ed.,
student ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (“[T]he effect of the appropriation decisions is to
recognize or create an exclusive right in the individual plaintiff to a species of trade
name, his own, and a kind of trade mark in his likeness. . . . [I]t is at least clearly
proprietary in its nature.”). In accord with Prosser’s depiction of the appropriation right
of privacy as proprietary in nature, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the interest
protected as follows:
The interest protected . . . is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use
of his own identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in
so far as the use may be of benefit to him or to others. Although the protection
of his personal feelings against mental distress is an important factor . . . the
right created by it is in the nature of a property right, for the exercise of which
an exclusive license may be given to a third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977).
However, it is probable that Prosser viewed the creation of a proprietary interest as
based in the tort’s protection against mental anguish. Prosser later clarified his position
on the basis for the proprietary nature of the interest protected in a little-known German
law review article published in 1956. In this article Prosser explained that his intent was
to create a right similar to the German right of personality. The German right of
personality protects both mental and commercial rights but is a personality right and not
an assignable property right. See PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at 94 & n.156 (citing
William Prosser, Das Recht auf die Privatsphäre in Amerika, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 401, 404 (1956)). The rush to
proclaim the appropriation privacy a property right from Prosser’s statement that it
protected a proprietary interest may have been premature, in the light of the analysis of
Calabresi and Melamed that a liability rule can have the effect of producing a licensable
entitlement, and not a property right per se, particularly where social or economic factors
mitigate against allowing alienability of the entitlement. See Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 115, at 1111–15. Prosser clearly stated that the four torts covered under right
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distinguished from the intrusion, false light, and disclosure of private
facts torts, which otherwise protect a right of inviolate personality and
the right to be let alone. These scholars rested their arguments on
Warren and Brandeis’s clear delineation of the right of privacy as not as
implicating any right of private property, but as a form of injuria, a
cause of action similar to battery—that of the right to one’s “inviolate
personality.”279 Legal scholars thus countered Prosser’s codification by
reasoning that the right of privacy should remain as a unified tort based
solely in the protection of human rights.280 Prosser’s somewhat
equivocal approach to the issue was to admonish that disputes over
whether the appropriation privacy tort constituted a property right were
“pointless.”281
Thus, despite its humble beginnings rooted in the protection of the
common man against commercial appropriation of his name or
photograph, the appropriation privacy tort was promptly and
expeditiously high-jacked by a parade of celebrity litigants who perhaps
saw in the tort a means of licensing their celebrity images without being
hampered by the statutory limitations normally imposed on intellectual
property rights.282 This rather striking development initially gave many
of privacy were not alienable rights. Prosser, supra note 234, at 408 (“[T]he plaintiff’s
right is a personal one . . . . The right is not assignable.”). For a further review of the
German right of personality, see 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY § 6:154, at 6-300 to 6-302 (2d ed. 2001); see generally Susanne
Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and in Germany: A Comparative
Analysis, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. REV. 479 (1999).
279. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 205, 207, 231. But see id. at 205 n.1
(indicating proprietary nature of unpublished manuscripts which, although not property,
may be an incorporeal right or “substantial right of legal interest”).
280. See Bloustein, supra note 249, at 962.
281. Prosser, supra note 234, at 406 (“It seems quite pointless to dispute over
whether such a right is to be classified as ‘property.’ If it is not, it is at least, once it its
protected by the law, a right of value upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling
licenses.” (citations omitted)).
282. This parade has included the likes of Elvis Presley (as represented by the heirs,
licensees and executors), Vanna White, Johnny Carson, Bette Midler, Michael Jordan,
and numerous other celebrities, authors, musicians, sports legends, scientists, and other
world-famous luminosities. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d
1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001) (Dustin in a designer dress); Groden v. Random House, Inc.,
61 F.3d. 1045, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (suit over defendant’s aspersions of Groden’s
Kennedy assassination theory); Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 636–37 (9th Cir.
1982) (Cher sues Forum Magazine over publication of an exclusive interview with US
Magazine); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(publication of life story of former member of the Temptations), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 (6th
Cir. 2001); MJ & Partners Rest. v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(licensees sue over exclusive use of Michael Jordan’s name in connection with Chicago
area restaurants); Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (Carl Sagan sues for his name being used as a code name for a new computer,
which code was later changed to “Butt-Head Astronomer”); Estate of Elvis Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1348, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (suit over Elvis impersonation,
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courts pause with reference to the internal conflicts inherent in applying
a privacy tort to a celebrity whose very fame required widespread
recognition and public use of their identity in a commercial context.283
This concern set in motion the establishment of a separate cause of
action for celebrity publicity rights, the right of publicity.284 Thomas P.
McCarthy, in his treatise on privacy and publicity, expressed the
differences between the appropriation right of privacy and the right of
publicity as follows:
The right of publicity is now a separate and distinct legal concept which
recognizes the proprietary and commercial value of a person’s identity and
persona. Simply put, an infringement of the right of publicity focuses upon
injury to the pocketbook, while an invasion of “appropriation privacy” focuses
upon injury to the psyche.285

Nevertheless, the question of the correct classification of the
appropriation privacy tort, and whether it protects a human right or a
property interest, continues to be debated to this day.286 And, because of
The Big El Show); Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (Sup. Ct.
1995) (internet service provider’s publication of Mr. Stern’s posterior).
283. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995)
(commenting on some courts’ refusal to apply the privacy tort action to celebrities).
284. The New York Court of Appeals attempted to solve this problem by
establishing the right of publicity as a separate tort from the appropriation right of
privacy in Haelan Labs. Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953). Later, an influential legal scholar defined the need for the right of publicity in a
law review article. Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203 (1954). Nimmer distinguished the right of publicity, a property right, from
the appropriation privacy tort, a personal right. Id. at 203. Nimmer is described by
Thomas P. McCarthy as the “first builder of the right of publicity.” MCCARTHY, supra
note 277 § 5:64, at 5-119. The Supreme Court, influenced by the views of Nimmer,
followed with its own legitimization of the publicity tort, classifying it as a separate
cause of action from the right to privacy in the celebrated “human cannonball” case,
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co. 433 U.S. 562, 572–73 (1977). Later, the
American Law Institute gave the right of publicity its own separate codification as a right
protecting the value inherent in a celebrity’s name, apart from the right of privacy.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. a (1995).
285. MCCARTHY supra note 277 § 5:61, at 5-110; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (1995) (“The history of the publicity tort . . . ha[s]
created confusion regarding the appropriate measure of damages. The right of publicity
protects the commercial value of a person’s identity . . . . [P]rotection is available under
the right of privacy for the personal interest in controlling the use and exploitation of
one’s own identity.”).
286. MCCARTHY, supra note 277 §§ 5:59 to 5:65, at 5-107 to 5-122; compare id. at
5-115 (“Modern decisions clearly distinguish between the various types of privacy and
the right of publicity.”), with ELDER, supra note 269, at 375 (“[M]ost more modern
decisions have emphasized that the tort protects a ‘valuable right of property in the
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the lack of clarity on this point, and regardless of Prosser’s careful fourtort classification schema, the law concerning the appropriation privacy
tort is repeatedly compared to a “haystack in a hurricane”,287 particularly
with respect to the question of the proprietary nature of the tort.
But, a review of the case law carefully distinguishing between cases
that are pleaded and decided under the appropriation privacy tort versus
those pleaded and decided under the right to publicity, reveals a
consistent trend of the courts to treat the appropriation right of privacy as
a personal right, distinct from the right to publicity.288 Furthermore, the
gravamen of the appropriation privacy tort lies not in protecting a
valuable thing against any loss of income from licensing revenues,289 but
rather in the right to define a zone of inviolate personality into which
commercial interests cannot intrude. Another way of stating this
distinction is that the right of publicity is analogous to an intellectual
property right,290 whereas the appropriation privacy right is analogous to
broadest sense of that term.’” (quoting McQueen v. Wilson, 161 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 1968),
rev’d on other grounds, Wilson v. McQueen, 162 S.E.2d 313 (Ga. 1968))). Mr. Elder
distinguishes between the right of publicity and the right of privacy only as it relates to
the issue of damages and bases the gravamen of the tort on property rights and the
prevention of unjust enrichment. Id. at 375–79.
287. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (D. Minn. 1970)
(Neville, J., despairing of the continuing lack of consistency in the state of the law).
288. See e.g., Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346 (D.N.J. 2000)
(acknowledging that majority trend is that privacy and publicity fall under separate and
distinct torts); Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (C.D. Cal.
1994); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 2000); Martin
Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697,
703 (Ga. 1982) (the fundamental distinction is the measure of damages); Bear Foot, Inc.
v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (collecting cases). But see
Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998) (distinction
largely semantic); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279–80 (D. Minn.
1970) (misappropriation involves pecuniary loss). Most recent decisions are fairly
consistent in their holdings that the appropriation right to privacy is a personal right,
unlike the right of publicity, which protects against commercial harm and otherwise
provides for a property right in the persona. See, e.g., Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18
Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 (Ct. App. 1993); Hudson v. Montcalm Publ’g Corp., 379 S.E.2d
572, 576–77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Jones v. Hudgins, 295 S.E.2d 119, 121–22 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982); Hetter v. State, 874 P.2d 762, 764–65 (Nev. 1994); Faber v. Condecor, Inc.,
477 A.2d 1289, 1294–95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co.,
581 A.2d 266, 268 (Vt. 1990). But see Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38
(5th Cir. 1994) (equating misappropriation with the expropriation of goodwill); MJ &
Partners Rest. v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (reasoning that the
appropriation privacy tort protected property rights, but eventually recognizing the
existence in Illinois a common law right to publicity instead).
289. The term “property” refers to legal relations between people with respect to
things and is used to describe a bundle of rights in the thing. The property bundle of
rights is as follows: “1) the right of possession, use and fruits or profits of the thing; 2)
the right to exclude others; [and] 3) the right to dispose of (e.g., to alienate) the thing.”
PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at 263.
290. And indeed, many courts have utilized concepts from intellectual property law
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the right to be free from defamation or battery.291 However, as opposed
to most torts protecting personal rights, the appropriation tort is
complete without proof of emotional distress or economic damage to the
plaintiff. The focus of the tort is the defendant’s intentional use of the
plaintiff’s identity for the defendant’s benefit. Thus, damages under the
tort may stem either from the harm suffered by the plaintiff or may be
calculated with reference to the economic benefit accruing to the
defendant.292
2. What are the Aspects of Identity and the Characteristics
of Its Indicia?
A second aspect of the nature of the privacy interest has to do with
what constitutes a “name” or “likeness” under the tort. The appropriation
tort includes under its protective ambit any appropriation of a name or
likeness for one’s use or benefit.293 If a computer profile is a likeness, it
could come under the protection of the tort. Although limited under
some privacy statutes,294 the majority of courts give a broad definition to
the indicia of identity.295 In essence, the tort has the capacity to protect
any tangible expression of identity that can be identified by others as a
in their analysis of the right of publicity. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques,
136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying the first-sale doctrine). For an analysis
of the right of publicity as an intellectual property right see PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at
263–80; cf. Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity,
49 DUKE L.J. 383 (1999) (applying copyright doctrines to publicity while also theorizing
that a Kantian foundation more accurately reflects the value of the human being behind
the persona at issue).
291. Laurence Tribe has suggested a parallel between the “psychic mayhem” caused
by violence to one’s personal identity and the physical injury caused by a battery. TRIBE,
supra note 138, at 887–88.
292. See, e.g., Harbin v. Jennings, 734 So. 2d 269, 273 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(Invasion of privacy in this type of action is an intentional tort and thus actual injury is
not essential to establish a case of liability, and nominal damages would apply).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
294. Some courts have drawn very narrow interpretations of these terms and have
thus delimited the concept to include only name or photographic likeness, although most
often this form of interpretive analysis arises in the context of statutory, and not common
law, privacy causes of action. Wilkinson v. Methodist, Richard Young Hosp., 612
N.W.2d 213, 216 (Neb. 2000) (concluding that under Nebraska’s privacy statute that
computer records could not constitute a form of “name or likeness,” because the statute
only mentioned photographs or other similar likenesses).
295. The author of the major treatise on privacy and publicity, Thomas McCarthy,
describes the cause of action as covering use of any “aspect of the plaintiff’s identity or
persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable from defendant’s use.” MCCARTHY,
supra note 277 § 5:60, at 5-109.
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symbol of the personality.296 The Ninth Circuit in White v. Samsung297
moreover indicated a preference for maintaining open, expansive
definitions of the contours of what might constitute identity. In White,
the court indicated it was not disposed to any set delineation of what
factors can constitute the identity under the right of publicity, because of
its concern that such a formulation would present an invitation to sharp
practices and abuse of the law.298
When the concept of identity is applied to a transaction profile, a
computer profile should be found to be an expression of the personality
in the same way that a signature, a voice, or a computer-altered
photograph has been found to be an expression of the personality.
Precedent indicates that courts are willing to admit identification of the
persona through extrinsic indicia, even where resemblances to the
plaintiff are completely and obviously artificial.299 These extrinsic
indicia do not have to be visual, but refer to any capture of identity.300
296. Very broad judicial interpretations to the dimensions of the aspect of identity
revealed in the persona have been found under the right of publicity. See, e.g., Hoffman
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001) (computer-altered
image); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (voice); Carson v.
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (nickname
associated with phrase implicating play on words, “The World’s Foremost
Commodian”); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822, 827
(9th Cir. 1974) (picture of a car identifiable with racecar driver Lothar Motschenbacher);
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(videotape); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970)
(statistics); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001)
(lithographic reproduction), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 806 (2002); Palmer v. Schonhorn
Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 459, 462 (N.J. 1967) (statistical profile). The right of
publicity is analogous to the right of privacy when assessing the definition of identity.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 46 cmt. a (1995) (“Although not
directly applicable, the rules stated here may be useful by analogy in evaluating claims
under the right of privacy arising from an unauthorized commercial exploitation of a
person’s identity.”). The Ninth Circuit even accorded the distinction of the persona of
Vanna White on a robot in a blonde wig. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d
1395, 1396–97 (9th Cir. 1992); accord, Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810–11
(9th Cir. 1997) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed with proof that the robots bore sufficient
resemblance to the plaintiffs); see also Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d
619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the right of publicity will “cover anything that
suggests the plaintiff’s personal identity” (collecting cases)); Mark D. Robins, Publicity
Rights in the Digital Media, Part I, THE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Nov. 2000, at 7–8.
297. White, 971 F.2d at 1395.
298. Id. at 1398 (“A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed only
through the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges the
clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth.”).
299. See Robins, supra note 296, at 7 (citing the White and Wendt decisions as
examples of identification through extrinsic indicia).
300. This is not to say that a profile could not eventually take the form of a visual
representation of an individual. See MCCARTHY, supra note 278 § 8:122, at 8-200 to
8-202 (discussing how recent technology permits the scanning of an individual’s image
to create a digital reproduction that can be manipulated in a computer. This technology
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And, indeed, at least one court has indicated that computerized records
contained in a database represent an identity for purposes of the tort.301
Second, aggregated financial data is also particularly likely to evoke
identity because of its essentially biographical nature. Financial data has
been called a “virtual current biography” of an individual.302
Biographical information of any type, when used for a defendant’s
commercial benefit, has traditionally brought liability under the tort.303
The rule is generally stated that, absent some redeeming social value or
newsworthiness exception, any use of biographical information for
commercial purposes without the subject’s express consent is actionable
under the tort.304 To carry this analysis forward and apply it to the practice
permits the so-called “rotoscoping” of an image so that it is now possible to superimpose
an image of a deceased actor into a live scene interacting with live actors); see also
PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at 419–20 (stating that technology may soon provide
Hollywood with the option of using reanimated actors rather than hiring the real one).
The potential for the combination of profiling and rotoscoping and the possible uses to
which these combined technologies might be put is quite intriguing.
301. Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 98-0897F, 1999 WL 494114, at *6–7 (Mass.
Super. June 29, 1999) (holding that records in a computer database are a name or
likeness under both the common law and the Massachusetts privacy statute) [hereinafter
Weld I]; cf. Crump v. Forbes, 52 Va. Cir. 52, 55 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (holding that an Internet
domain name is a name under Virginia’s statutory right of action).
302. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
303. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. 1967) (holding that
the use of statistical or biographical data for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name of
the individual by using it in connection with a commercial project other than the
dissemination of news or articles or biographies provided liability under the
appropriation privacy tort); accord Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283
(D. Minn. 1970). The tort is invoked by virtue of the unconsented use of the information
for some benefit of the defendant. See Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp.
904, 909–10 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that the infringing use must be mainly for purposes
of trade, without a redeeming public interest, news or historical value); Palmer, 232
A.2d at 462 (“[A]lthough the publication of biographical data of a well-known figure
does not per se constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of that same data for the
purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commercial
project other than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies does.”); Flores v.
Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 857 (N.Y. 1959) (distinguishing use of photo in item
of general public interest and information versus “a use in, or as part of, an
advertisement or solicitation for patronage”); Rall v. Hellman, 726 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632
(App. Div. 2001) (stating in dicta that a fabricated e-mail discussion may have been
actionable under the appropriation tort if it had attracted customers to defendant’s Web
site); Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1995)
(commenting that if the ads at issue used plaintiff’s name and likeness to advertise
products unrelated to news dissemination, plaintiff would have stated a claim for relief).
304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (1977). Because the
cornerstone of the tort is appropriation for purposes of taking advantage of some value
associated with an individual, biographical information that is published for a
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of profiling, a financial institution’s use of a customer’s transaction data for
marketing purposes in no way provides newsworthy information to the
public. Nor does it fill a socially useful purpose or substantially add to
cultural values. Rather, the sole purpose behind profiling and the sale of
profiled information by financial institutions is to enable the financial
institutions to increase their profitability and market dominance. Therefore
the use of a consumer’s transaction data for marketing purposes is not likely
to be subject to the newsworthiness exception.305
A third approach to demonstrating that a computer profile is a form of
identity under the appropriation tort is to recognize that the data profile
may be a type of photograph. Photography can no longer be defined as a
chemical process.306 Because photographs and other visual images are
now often created, stored, and transferred in a digital form, a photograph
is now most accurately defined as data that, when combined in aggregate
form, creates an image that invokes an associational linkage to a distinct
and recognizable individual.307 Thus, a photograph is just another form
of information. And aggregated information, when profiled, creates the
newsworthy, parody or entertainment purpose is not actionable. Id. at cmt d.
305. One very attractive feature of the appropriation tort may be its ability to sustain
most First Amendment challenges. Although the issue has not yet been passed upon by
the Supreme Court, the appropriation branch of the right of privacy, being a personal
right with proprietary overtones, is likely to trump the somewhat limited First
Amendment protections that are accorded to commercial speech under the Central
Hudson balancing test. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). “The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” Id. at 562
(citation omitted). But see U.S. West Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1237–38 (10th Cir.
1999) (striking down an FCC order restricting the use, disclosure and access to a
telecommunications customer’s proprietary network information without the customer’s
prior express opt-in to the disclosure, because the regulation did not directly and
materially advance the government’s interest in privacy). But if profiling activities are
deemed to be more deceptive than informational in character, the activity would
probably receive no First Amendment protection. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563
(“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about
lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive
the public than to inform it.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). However, the
regulation of computer profiling activities may escape First Amendment scrutiny
altogether. The Supreme Court has also indicated that computer processing is a “thing in
interstate commerce,” and thus the First Amendment protections of commercial speech
may be completely inapposite to data profiling and, possibly, to data exchange. See
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000).
306. See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1102 (college ed. 1964) (defining
photography as a process “producing images of objects upon a photo sensitive surface by
the chemical action of light or other radiant energy”).
307. See LAUDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 26. In the words of Bill Gates, “The world
is totally going digital.” Id. This digitization means that information of all types, television,
movies, telecommunications, books, home shopping and bill paying, and all other forms of
audio and video images will soon take the uniform form of digital bits. See id.
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same associative capture of identity as does a photograph. In fact, some
technical literature describing the technology of profiling uses the
illustrative example of a phased-resolution digital photograph to depict
how the increased aggregation of information will eventually produce a
“clear enough image of your customer that you can create and market a
product to her that will fit her like a glove.”308 Personally identifiable
transaction data, when profiled, can thus be described as a personality
“portrait”309 or behavioral photograph of an individual, and it should
reasonably receive the same level of protection under the appropriation
tort as does its photographic counterpart.
An analysis of the interrelation of the appropriation and publicity torts
with copyright law further shows that the exact tangible expression of
the identity is somewhat irrelevant and that the material issue is whether
the subject’s persona is identifiable by the tangible expression. The law
is settled that the persona is not copyrightable.310 Although it is not
settled to what extent and in what circumstances copyright pre-emption
does or does not apply to the persona,311 cases dealing with copyright
pre-emption generally demonstrate that the persona is distinct and
separate from the tangible expression of the persona that may be subject
to copyright law.312 There is some quality of a person’s being that,
308. Id. at 442.
309. ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 16 (“[T]he [ac]cumulation
over time of vast numbers of seemingly minor details about an individual produces a
portrait that is quite comprehensive and, to many inherently intrusive.”).
310. See 1 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][c], at 1-24
(2001) (“A persona can hardly be said to constitute a ‘writing’ of an ‘author’ within the
meaning of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. A fortiori, it is not a ‘work of
authorship’ under the Act.” (citations omitted)).
311. See, e.g., Mark D. Robins, Publicity Rights in the Digital Media, Part II, THE
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Dec. 2000, at 29, 32 (“[I]t is far from clear that the aspects
of the actor’s identity can be separated from the copyrightable dramatic performance and
given protection without eviscerating the [copy]right to prepare derivative works.”).
312. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658–59 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the tort of misappropriation protects a person’s persona, which is not copyrightable
because it does not consist of a writing of an author; placement in or on a tangible
medium does not change this analysis); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (2d
Cir. 1981) (“A voice is not copyrightable. . . . What is put forward as protectible here is
more personal than any work of authorship.”); Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp.
2d 337, 352–53 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that a voice is not copyrightable, as distinguished
from the copyrightable recording of a voice); Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5
F. Supp. 2d 823, 836–37 (C.D. Cal. 1998); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d
713, 722–23 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that because a persona is not copyrightable, the
unauthorized publication is not the equivalent of a copyright infringement claim and is
not preempted). The legislative history also indicates congressional intent to not apply
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although captured by a tangible medium, is distinct from the tangible
medium. Thus, what constitutes an indicia of the persona relates simply
to whether the tangible expression is evocative of and identifiable to an
individual, and not to the material form or substance of the tangible
medium. Profiled financial data is distinctly identifiable by virtue of an
account number or social security number that relates the profile to a
particular person. A profile is furthermore evocative of the data subject
in that it derives its market value by virtue of its ability to create an
identification with, and by its ability to predict the behavior of a
particular person. Thus, a computer profile should unquestionably be
found to constitute an indicia of identity.
3. How Is the Interest Invaded?
The appropriation privacy tort is typically invaded by the defendant’s
advertising use of the plaintiff’s identity.313 Although some courts have
sought to limit the tort’s coverage to only apply to advertising use,314 the
law does not restrict the tort in this way.315 But in general, advertising
use is broadly construed by the courts,316 and includes any form of use
that might be an advertisement in disguise.317 Furthermore, no actual
endorsement of a product by the plaintiff is necessary to establish an
advertising use.318 Profiling could easily be found to constitute advertising
use because profiling facilitates marketing activities targeted individually
at the consumer for purposes of inducing the consumer to purchase
particular products or services. Thus, even though technology provides
the capacity to advertise to a micro-segmented audience of only one
individual, it is still advertising toward that one individual. And because
the tort does not require any actual endorsement of a product by the
plaintiff, the fact that the advertising is directed back at the data subject
himself, rather than at third parties, should not make any difference for
copyright pre-emption to the persona. See H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748 (“The evolving common law rights of ‘privacy,’
‘publicity’ and trade secrets . . . would remain unaffected as long as the causes of action
contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or
confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.”).
313. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 77 cmt. (1990).
314. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994); Shibley
v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977) (“[The tort]
applies . . . when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness for his
own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though
the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.”).
316. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 77 (1990) (defining advertising use as “the use of a
person’s name or picture for all types of promotional endeavors”).
317. See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994).
318. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 857 (N.Y. 1959).
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purposes of defining profiling as advertising under the tort.
But, the tort also includes within its parameters any other use of the
plaintiff’s persona that accrues to the defendant’s benefit.319 The
concept of benefit has been broadly defined and, unless otherwise
limited by statute, does not require that the benefit be economic.320
Profiling handsomely benefits a financial institution. And it is immaterial
for purposes of the appropriation tort whether that benefit comes in the
form of the economic benefits of increased sales generated by targeted
marketing or through the increased profits from risk-based credit pricing,
or in the somewhat less tangible goodwill that accrues to the financial
institution through increased customer satisfaction or efficiency.
4. What Constitutes an Appropriation?
Assuming that profiling provides a benefit to financial institutions by
means of the use of consumers’ identities, it is then necessary to
continue the analysis to determine whether profiling also implicates an
appropriation. Appropriation under the tort occurs only where the
defendant “appropriate[s] to his own use or benefit the reputation,
prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or other values of
the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”
319. For instance, liability under the tort has been found where a defendant derived
some benefit from the impersonation or mimicry of an individual. See e.g., Wendt v.
Host Intern., Inc. 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (robot look alike); Waits v. Frito-Lay
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (sound alike); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992) (robot look alike); Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) (sound alike); Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F.
Supp. 2d 337, 339–41 (D.N.J. 2000) (sound alike); Onassis v. Christian-Dior N.Y., Inc.,
472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256, 263 (App. Div. 1984) (look alike). Of course, any discussion of
the right of publicity would not be complete without an Elvis case. See, e.g., Estate of
Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1361 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis impersonator).
The benefit found in each of these cases is analogous to that derived from profiling,
where the benefit a commercial entity receives is by virtue of the computer profile’s
ability to simulate or mimic a consumer’s future behavior.
320. Thus, benefit has been found where a scientist’s name was used as an internal
code name for a new product in development, Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F.
Supp. 1072, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1994), where defendant used plaintiff’s name to provide a
father for an illegitimate child on a birth certificate, Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97, 97,
101 (N.J. 1907), where defendant used a plaintiff’s name on a petition without consent,
Schwartz v. Edrington, 62 So. 660, 662–63 (La. 1913), and where defendant forged
plaintiff’s signature on an income-tax return, Schlessman v. Schlessman, 361 N.E.2d
1347, 1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). Statutory privacy actions often limit the parameters of
the tort to uses of the plaintiff’s identity for commercial benefit. For a review of state
statutes, see ELDER, supra note 269, at 449–72.
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Perhaps because the concept of benefit is so amorphous and because
the scope of appropriation is so potentially far reaching under the tort,
courts limit the scope of appropriation in several ways. First,
appropriation does not include uses of a plaintiff’s identity that are of
general public interest or that otherwise accrue to society’s general
benefit.321 Second, courts have consistently declined to find tort liability
where the information does not have a meaning-making or valuecreating aspect for the appropriator.322 Third, when applying the tort to
information privacy, courts have required some use or disclosure of the
information that infringes the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.323 Therefore, when applying the tort to information privacy, an
appropriation occurs only where the following three factors are present:
(1) the use of the information is outside the scope of a socially beneficial
function, such as fraud detection, crime prevention or national security;
(2) the personal information is collected, aggregated and processed in
such a manner as to create value for the data collector; and (3) where the
use of the information is inherently intrusive or is used for purposes that
otherwise infringe the consumer’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
And indeed, one court recently applied this analysis to the profiling of
medical information and found the appropriation tort actionable. The
trio of cases in the Weld v. CVS action324 may change the paradigms of
tort law relating to information privacy. The Weld case arose from CVS
Pharmacy’s entry into an alliance agreement with several drug company
partners, whereby it agreed to sell its customers’ private transaction
information to these drug companies for marketing purposes.325 The
321. See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text.
322. But see Bartow, supra note 128, at 695–96 (suggesting that where data is
compiled it can have broad meaning or can serve as the basis for broad meaning-making
to the same extent that a celebrity’s image has meaning-making power); cf. Dwyer v.
Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff
failed the test of appropriation because: “[A] single, random cardholder’s name has little
or no intrinsic value to defendants . . . . Furthermore, defendants’ practices do not
deprive any of the cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”).
Three accordant decisions discuss the sale of a customer’s name to a third party for
marketing purposes without the customer’s consent. See generally Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d
1351; Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); U.S. News & World
Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 WL 1065557 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996).
These cases have generally stood for the principle that the sale of names to a third party
in a subscription list is not deemed an appropriation for purposes of the tort.
323. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1355; Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339–40.
324. See Weld I, supra note 301; Weld v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., No. CIV. A. 980897, 1999 WL 1565175 (Mass. Super. Nov. 19, 1999), aff’d, Weld v Glaxo Wellcome,
Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 2001).
325. CVS began the program in 1998, using profiles extracted from its database of
transaction information to identify those customers that might be potential targets for
marketing offers from its drug company partners. CVS first profiled its customers to
determine to whom to send the mailings. It then provided a third party with a disk
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consumer outrage over CVS’ marketing program eventually caused CVS
to abandon this practice, but not before several lawsuits were filed by
consumers who received these solicitations.
Several plaintiffs
accordingly brought suit under, inter alia, Massachusetts’s statutory right
of privacy,326 “tortuous misappropriation of private and personal
information,”327 and state unfair trade practices, premised on the
defendant’s violation of the plaintiffs’ privacy rights.328 The court
denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and found that
the question of whether the systematic searching of a computer database
in conjunction with the use of the name and address of the plaintiffs for
the defendant’s benefit constituted a violation of the plaintiff’s statutory
right of privacy was a “novel question suitable for initial resolution by a
jury.”329 In analyzing the applicability of the common law appropriation
tort to the facts of the case, the court looked at whether the use of the
information was for socially beneficial purposes or whether such use
was merely for defendants’ financial gain.330 Next, the court noted the
inherent invasiveness of the profiling of medical records.331 The court
had separately found that the consumer had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his prescription drug information.332 The court therefore held
that the use of plaintiff’s pharmaceutical records for the defendant’s
financial gain fell within the scope of the common law appropriation
privacy cause of action.333
There is no reason not to apply the same rationale to the profiling of
containing a listing of the targeted customers’ names, addresses, and dates of birth. The
third party then provided the disk to a mail fulfillment house, which sent out mailings to
the customers. The mailings reminded the customers to refill their prescription
medications, provided information concerning new drugs, or encouraged them to discuss
certain conditions with their doctors. Funding for these mailings was provided entirely by
the drug manufacturers. CVS’ customers were never informed nor did they give consent to
the disclosures that occurred under this program. See Weld I, supra note 301, at *1–2.
326. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (1974).
327. Weld I, supra note 301, at *6–8. The court extrapolated the common law
appropriation privacy cause of action from the pleadings, regardless of the fact that the
appropriation privacy tort does not depend on the confidential nature of the information
or on any disclosure. Id. Whether the plaintiff actually intended to plead the common
law appropriation tort is unclear; the plaintiff did plead the analogous statutory cause of
action. Id. at *3–5.
328. Id. at *6.
329. Id. at *5.
330. Id. at *6.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at *6–7.
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financial information, which has been analogized to medical
information.334 First, profiling for marketing purposes cannot be said to
have a purpose that is beneficial for any other goal than the financial
institution’s own profit motive. Second, aggregated financial data is
deemed predictive of future behavior and, unlike a simple address list,
can be used to manipulate a consumer and create meaning and value for
the data collector.335 Sensitive financial transaction data cannot be
described as trivial but rather can include hundreds of thousands of
purchases that produce a very invasive picture of the individual
consumer. And that picture may be used for such nontrivial uses as
predicting that individual’s future behavior and thereby shifting the
economic balance of power from the consumer. Third, profiling of
financial data provides a very granular picture of an individual’s
personal behavior and beliefs that is inherently intrusive. Furthermore,
in the same way as a customer of a pharmacy has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in prescription drug information, a customer of a
financial institution also has a reasonable expectation of privacy that his
or her personal financial profile will not be used for marketing purposes
without express or implied consent.

334. Rob Blackwell, Bush Privacy Decision: Financial Data Next? AM. BANKER,
April 18, 2001, at 1 (“Financial privacy is in many ways just as sensitive as medical
privacy, in that much of our private personal spending involves health. Your financial
records are your family’s DNA and should not be reproduced or transmitted to others
without your permission.”).
335. An approach that distinguishes a simple customer list, phone number or other
solitary data point from an aggregated profile of an individual for purposes of liability
under the tort is in accord with economic analysis as well. Posner in his law review
article containing an economic analysis of the law of privacy, approves withholding any
privacy right in a name or address because it follows an efficient economic rationale.
Posner, supra note 81, at 398–99. In Posner’s view, the high transaction costs inherent
in obtaining a customer’s consent prior to any disclosure of their information to third
parties in a mailing list outweigh any possible worth to the individual of being shielded
from that disclosure. This is because, in Posner’s words, the information about the
subscribers that is disclosed is “trivial.” Id. However, Posner goes on to suggest that the
economic analysis of personal information changes when the purchaser of the
information can use that information to “impose substantial costs on the subscribers” or
otherwise can use the information to gain an economic advantage over the person to
whom the information pertains. Id. at 399. Thus, under Posner’s economic analysis of
the tort, because profiling allows a business to use a customer’s information to gain a
distinct economic advantage, profiling should bring liability under a privacy cause of
action. An argument can also be made that a financial institution is the cheaper cost
avoider and, just as a consumer goods manufacturer is required to design all reasonable
safety features into its products, a data collector should similarly be required to obtain a
consumer’s express consent prior to using a consumer’s data for profiling purposes. The
transaction costs of protecting privacy are actually quite low. An opt-in program for data
sharing would cost a mere seventeen cents per day per customer if, in a worst-case
scenario, less than ten percent of customers agreed to opt-in. Frank Hayes, Privacy?
Bank on It, COMPUTERWORLD, May 7, 2001, at 78.
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C. The Limits of Consent: The Right to Privacy Versus
the Privacy Policy
Whether the right of privacy against the profiling of personal financial
information arises out of the intrusion branch or the appropriation branch
of the privacy tort, it is likely that a colorable claim of invasion of
privacy could be made. Indeed, the fact that financial information is
accorded a particularly private status is a concept that has long been
ingrained in the social consciousness.336 In recognition of this fact,
financial institutions have traditionally published privacy policies that
served to articulate and clarify the general parameters of their existing
common law duties for the protection of personal financial
information.337 However, gradually the privacy policy has ceased to fill
this traditional role and now under the GLBA, operates to contract
around a consumer’s reasonable expectation of privacy and permits the
financial institution to sell a customer’s private account information to
third parties unless the customer opts out of that disclosure.338 However,
the states are permitted to establish laws that are more protective of
privacy than those set forth in the GLBA.339 And judicial recognition of
the common law privacy torts in the context of financial privacy, no less
336. Until recently, the fact that a bank would even consider itself at liberty to use
its customer’s personal financial information for marketing purposes would have been
unthinkable. See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (“It
is inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider itself at liberty to disclose the
intimate details of its depositors’ accounts. Inviolate secrecy is on of the inherent and
fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers . . . .”).
337. See FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-15 (stating that the privacy policy has “the
goal of making disclosures of customer information conform to the norm of
confidentiality in the industry to which the institution belongs”). This is consistent with
the general law applicable to adhesion contracts; that is, they generally are enforceable
only to the extent they do not deviate significantly from an implied “set of background
rules” grounded in common law and social norms. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1181–83 (1983).
338. See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CHASE PRIVACY POLICY 2 (n.d.) (“Chase
shares information it has about you . . . to give you superior customer service, provide
convenient access to our services and make a wider range of products available to you.”).
339. Existing federal legislation is likely not to pre-empt state tort law which would
mandate an opt-in standard. The GLBA provides the states with the opportunity to enact
laws that are more protective of privacy if these laws are not in conflict with the GLBA.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text. It is doubtful that an opt-in standard would
be in conflict with the GLBA, which sets forth as its controlling purpose the proposition
that financial institutions have an “affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the
privacy of [their] customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those
customers’ nonpublic personal information.” 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000).
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than action by the legislature, would be one mechanism for the states to
establish such privacy protections.340 If the privacy tort were given such
judicial recognition, the question would then arise as to whether the optout privacy policies currently in use by financial institutions would
operate as a waiver of the consumer’s right of privacy.
The ancient legal maxim, volenti fit injuria sets forth the fundamental
legal principle that there is no wrong done to one who consents.341
Consent is therefore an affirmative defense to a privacy cause of
action.342 Consent is willingness for conduct to occur.343 To be deemed
effective, consent (1) must be made by one who has the capacity to
consent, and (2) is effective only within the scope and within any
conditions of the consent.344 Consent is void where given under a
Under the stringent
substantial misrepresentation or mistake.345
informed consent parameters of tort law, it is unlikely that an opt-out
process demonstrates sufficient consent to waive a privacy right.346
McCarthy views the principle of consent to be synonymous to a
license to the privacy right.347 Under this analysis, recent decisions
concerning the enforceability of “click-wrap” licenses are instructive in
analyzing the enforceability of privacy polices. In Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp.,348 the District Court for the Southern District of
340. As was expressed by Nimmer in his argument for the establishment of the right
of publicity:
This raises the final question of the right of our courts, in the absence of
legislation, to enforce a right not previously recognized. Here we may return
to the essay by Brandeis and Warren . . . . The argument was there advanced
that ‘the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the common law’
would with respect to the right of privacy ‘enable the judges to afford the
requisite protection, without the interposition of the legislature.’ That this
proved true is attested by judicial opinions in fifteen jurisdictions.
Nimmer, supra note 284, at 223 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 195).
341. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “One who effectively consents to
conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the
conduct or harm resulting from it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 A (1977).
342. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
343. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977). Although consent does not
need to be manifested by express words or action, no cases have been reported where
consent was not manifested but was still proved. Id. cmt. b reporters’ notes.
344. Id. § 892A. Consent can also generally be revoked at any time. Id. There is a
strong presumption of revocability where the consent is gratuitous. See McAndrews v.
Roy, 131 So. 2d 256, 259 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 271
N.Y.S. 187, 188–89 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1977).
346. See Litman, supra note 116, at 1310–11 (“The tort law version of consent
doesn’t depend on formalities like opt-in or opt-out. Rather it requires that the subject
appreciate the act that she consents to and be in fact willing that it occur.”).
347. See MCCARTHY, supra note 277 §10:21, at 10-31 to 10-32 (“There is no reason
[the rules of consent] could not also be viewed as rules governing a ‘license’ of the
privacy right . . . .”).
348. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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New York, using California law, reviewed the enforceability of an
online license that did not require the licensee to click “I agree” before
downloading the licensor’s software.349 The court, comparing the license
to a “browse-wrap” license,350 refused to hold the arbitration clause in the
license enforceable. The court reasoned that because the licensee was not
made aware that he was entering into a contract and not required to do
anything to manifest assent other than take possession of the product,351
no contract was formed.352 Specht is a significant case, because the
court based its holding not on any substantive unconscionability of the
arbitration clause, but rather on procedural unconscionability, based on
the lack of the adherent’s actual assent.353 Although procedural
unconscionability has been a largely dormant legal principle in light of the
practical necessity for adhesion contracts in mass market transactions, the
Specht case demonstrates that there are still limits to consent by
adhesion.354 A similar recognition of procedural unconscionability is
349. This license permitted the licensee to download the software absent any
requirement to affirmatively to indicate their assent to the license agreement, or even to
view the license agreement. If the licensee chose to click on the underlined text in the
invitation, a hypertext link took the licensee to a Web page entitled “License & Support
Agreements” where the licensee could view the terms of the license. Id. at 588.
Plaintiffs alleged that their usage of the software improperly permitted the defendant to
receive private information about the user’s file transfer activity on the Internet. Id. at 587.
350. A browse-wrap license refers to where a Web site offers proprietary
information, subject to the user’s acceptance of an online license agreement. The user is
not required to click on an icon expressing assent to the license, or even to view its
terms, before proceeding to use the information on the site. Id. at 594.
351. Id. at 595 (“The only hint that a contract is being formed is one small box of
text referring to the license agreement, text that appears below the screen used for
downloading and that a user need not even see before obtaining the product . . . .”).
352. Id. at 596 (“The case law on software licensing has not eroded the importance
of assent in contract formation. Mutual assent is the bedrock of any agreement to which
the law will give force. Defendants’ position, if accepted, would so expand the
definition of assent as to render it meaningless.”).
353. Id. Unconscionability takes both a procedural and substantive form. See
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). Procedural unconscionability relates to the inability of the
consumer to negotiate terms of the contract. Substantive unconscionability relates to the
imposition of harsh or oppressive terms on the adherent. See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger
et al., Consumer Protection Rules in and Around the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA), INTERNET L. & BUS., Nov. 2001, at 11. Because contracts of
adhesion are an accepted form of transacting commerce in mass-market consumer
transactions, which by definition involve procedural unconscionability, most
unconscionability claims in the online environment either must involve the imposition of
oppressively harsh terms (a rare instance) or (more typically) must involve a limitation
of remedies. Id. at 11–13.
354. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment,
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found in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA),
whereby a “procedural breakdown” in an online contract can invalidate a
contractual term.355
If this analysis is applied to an information transfer under an opt-out
privacy policy, a similar conclusion results, even though the licensor of
personal information fills the unusual role of the adherent to the
purported contract.356 Under opt-out privacy policies, the adherent is not
required to do anything to manifest assent to be bound to the terms of the
privacy policy. An opt-out privacy policy written in fine print,
containing highly complex terms, received with a monthly billing
statement stuffed with advertisements, is perhaps more suspect on
procedural grounds than an online license that does not require the
adherent to click “I agree” to the license terms. Furthermore, the privacy
policies developed by financial institutions in the wake of the GLBA are
particularly suspect procedurally, because they often contain unusually
broad or rather vague statements of the permissible uses of customer
data.357 And although a consumer ostensibly has the right to opt-out of
information sharing, a broad interpretation of the exceptions in the GLBA
may encourage a financial institution to utilize these exceptions to
substantially eviscerate the consumer’s opt-out choice.358 It is therefore
likely that the only contract for the licensing of personal information
formed by these opt-out privacy policies is the implied contract defined by
the social norms set forth by the financial institution’s duty of
confidentiality and the customer’s reasonable expectation of privacy.359
Therefore, in the face of a privacy tort claim, a privacy policy based on
an opt-out mechanism would probably be effective to show consent only
75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1159 (2000) (“[W]e should notice that it matters to what extent the
world of exchange consists of these contracts that are suspect on autonomy grounds. If
people right and left are having their entitlements rearranged . . . without their consent,
that is a different social world.”).
355. UCITA § 111 Official Cmt. 3 (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.pdf. UCITA is a model statute focusing on electronic commerce.
See id. at Prefatory Note.
356. Margaret Jane Radin suggests that adhesion contracts for privacy rights may be
suspect on substantive unconscionability grounds as well. “[P]olicymakers [must] take
on the task of deciding which terms it is important to draw buyers’ attention to in order
to preserve their autonomy, and which kinds of terms must be simply excluded on
autonomy grounds. Redress limited to Los Angeles could be in the first category; waiver
of all personal privacy rights could be in the second.” Radin, supra note 354, at 1161
(discussing whether or not the liberal social construct of consent should be retained).
357. See, e.g., BANK OF AM. CORP., PRIVACY POLICY FOR CONSUMERS (2002) (“We
collect and use various types of [customer] information to service your accounts, save
you time and money, and better respond to your needs.”).
358. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text.
359. The few courts that have construed privacy policies have interpreted them very
narrowly. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nationsbank, 776 A.2d 645, 651–53 (Md. 2001).
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to the extent it materially aligns with the consumer’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. As previously demonstrated, most profiling
activities are quite likely to fail this test. A financial institution is
therefore well-advised to refrain from undertaking profiling activities
merely on the basis of an opt-out privacy policy. Rather, it should fully
disclose and obtain the consumer’s express opt-in consent prior to
undertaking any intrusive profiling activities and prior to any sharing of
data with third parties for such purposes. Practices that do not conform to
this standard may subject a financial institution to liability under common
law privacy causes of action. And, the common law privacy tort can also
serve as a foundation for a consumer to launch additional statutory claims.
D. Potential Remedies Under the Theory: Utilizing the
“Little FTC Acts”
Although the privacy tort may provide a valid cause of action with
which to challenge profiling activities by financial services entities, the
difficulty of establishing damages significant enough to make the claim
worthwhile serves as an impediment to any practical use of the cause
of action. In cases involving tortious use of the plaintiff’s financial
information, the plaintiff’s actual damages may be quite small or
otherwise difficult to prove or quantify.360 The only practical method of
litigating the claim would be by virtue of a class action. And class
actions founded on a privacy tort claim are quite difficult to certify and
are subject to numerous other procedural challenges.361
For these reasons, a privacy cause of action is perhaps useful only in
the respect that it can serve as leverage to support a cause of action
under existing consumer fraud and unfair trade practices statutes.362
360. Under the appropriation tort, a plaintiff may recover for the loss of the
exclusive use of the value so appropriated. One who suffers intrusion on seclusion may
recover damages for deprivation of that seclusion. In addition, the plaintiff may recover
damages for emotional distress or humiliation that normally results from such an
invasion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H cmt. a (1977) (emphasis added).
361. See, e.g., Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct App. 1975)
(“Because this right to privacy which is being asserted differs from person to person . . .
it cannot be said that appellants’ claims are typical of the class as a whole.”).
362. Other statutes provide remedies as well. For instance, the appropriation and
intrusion privacy torts, if expanded to information privacy issues, could substantially
change the analysis of liability for Internet profiling under the Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C. §
2511 (2000). Recent cases where plaintiffs have sought to obtain relief from corporate
profiling practices under this statute have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, inter
alia, because the plaintiff was not able to fulfill the requirement of the statute that
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Recognizing the effectiveness of the consumer fraud statutes in the
protection of information privacy, state attorneys general have recently
utilized these laws to attempt to protect financial privacy.363 These
actions evolved from some rather egregious behavior by banks in their
use of consumer transaction data—financial institutions quietly began
trading their customers’ personal financial information to direct
marketers (perhaps relying on their privacy policies that purported to
permit such unlimited uses). The consumer outrage quickly led the
attorneys general of several states to bring investigations of these
practices based on state consumer protection laws.364 These actions have
deterred not only the institutions that were subject to the investigations,
but have also spurred quite a bit of self-regulation by financial
institutions in general,365 and many institutions have even temporarily
halted or reduced many disclosures of financial information to third
plaintiff prove that he or she had been harmed by defendant’s commission of a tortious
act. Id. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter . . . unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act
in violation of the Constitution or law of the United States or of any State.”). See, e.g.,
In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277–78 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding a “bare
allegation” not enough to survive motion to dismiss, thus the court concluded not that
plaintiffs’ claims were false, but simply that they failed to allege a tortious purpose); In re
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing
plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act as follows: “In light of the abundant evidence that
DoubleClick’s motivations have been licit and commercial and the utter lack of evidence
that its intent has been tortious, we find as a matter of law that plaintiffs have failed to
allege that DoubleClick has acted with a ‘tortious’ purpose.”) (emphasis added).
363. See generally Fickenscher, supra note 257.
364. Most notable was the New York Attorney General’s consent decree with
Chase Manhattan. The attorney general made an inquiry and found that Chase had
violated, inter alia, the consumer protection laws of the State of New York. See In re
Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., (N.Y. Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Prot. Jan 21,
2000) (assurance of discontinuance pursuant to executive law § 63(15)), reprinted in
SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW, supra note 13, at 247–58. See generally
Fickenscher, supra note 257. Chase Manhattan was reportedly selling account
information about its customers to several marketers of nonfinancial products. Chase’s
privacy policy was central to the attorney general Spitzer’s case. Because Chase
allegedly did not follow its own privacy policy, the state lawsuit would largely have been
based on state laws against deceptive labor practices. After meeting with the attorney
general, Chase agreed to limit its information sharing to names, addresses and telephone
numbers of customer’s approving of such uses. Id. U.S. Bancorp was investigated by
twenty state attorneys general for similar practices including the sale of consumer credit
report information. The bank was sued by the Minnesota Attorney General for allegedly
violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Id. More recently, the Minnesota Attorney
General filed suit against Fleet Mortgage Corporation on state consumer fraud and
deceptive trade practices laws pursuant to Fleet’s use of customer information for a
telemarketing campaign. State v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964–65
(D. Minn. 2001). Fleet’s motion to dismiss was denied on all counts. Id. at 968.
365. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 263–66. But some of the selfregulatory behavior results only in the publication of information without offering any
real protections to consumers. Id. at 264.
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party marketing organizations.366 Some have thus suggested that the
solution for information privacy in general may lie in the effective
utilization of unfair competition laws.367
However, consumer protection laws do have limitations in their
application to information privacy. State consumer protection laws generally
require proof of an unfair, unlawful, or deceptive trade practice to be
successful.368 Because state statutes generally are modeled after the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),369 a showing of unfairness
requires a practice to “cause[ ] or [be] likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition.”370 Because this is a very difficult burden for the
plaintiff to meet, most litigated cases are based instead on the “deception”
subset.371 The practical effect of this is that the financial institution’s
publication of a privacy policy that informs the customer of the uses and
disclosures of transaction data and complies with the requirements of the
GLBA generally is not deemed deceptive.372 Any use of deceptive trade
366. Fickenscher, supra note 257. However, these salutary effects precede the
enactment of the GLBA, which may reverse this trend by legitimizing the transfer of
transaction data to affiliates as well as to third parties, subject to financial institutions’
compliance with the GLBA’s notice requirements. See supra notes 227–31 and
accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 111; see also Fickenscher, supra note 257 (stating
that the New York Attorney General’s privacy settlement with Chase Manhattan Corp.
could be a “blueprint for addressing the issue of the use of customer data”). Fickenscher
suggests that New York’s action against Chase would likely have centered on allegations
of Chase’s deceptive contravention of its own privacy policy. Id.
368. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 1992 & Supp 2002).
California’s Business and Professions Code, regulating unfair business practices,
requires the commission of “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” to be actionable. Id. Courts
have construed the Act to be based in the right of the public to protection from fraud and
deceit. See People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat’l Research Co. of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520–21
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962). An unfair business practice is one that “offends an established
public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234–35 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent
Homes, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Ct. App. 1984)).
369. Sovern, supra note 111, at 1352.
370. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000).
371. See Sovern, supra note 111, at 1352; see also Michael M. Greenfield,
Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on State Law, 46 WAYNE L.
REV. 1869, 1877 (2000) (discussing cases litigated before the FTC).
372. See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973
P.2d 527, 541 (Cal. 1999) (holding that under the California Business and Professions

1015

FINALGERTZ.DOC

2/11/2020 3:23 PM

practices law would therefore normally require a fact pattern where a
financial institution violates it own privacy policy, greatly limiting the
scope of use of state consumer protection laws for financial privacy.
The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) enforcement of federal unfair
and deceptive trade practice laws under the FTC Act373 reflects this same
limitation. While banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal credit
unions are outside of the Act’s purview,374 the FTC’s enforcement of the
FTC Act does serve as a guideline to the states’ unfair and deceptive trade
practices regulation. The FTC has recently taken the approach that the
publication of a privacy policy satisfies the institution’s obligations to
consumers and provides that any use and disclosure of that data in accord
with that privacy policy will not be in violation of deceptive trade
practices laws.375 The FTC takes this approach in spite of the fact that the
privacy policy effectively operates as a contract of adhesion.
Furthermore, privacy policies are subject only to industry self-regulation
and are not currently subject to any specific FTC requirements for what
minimally constitutes a fair privacy policy.376 Moreover, because
institutions are free to craft the terms of their privacy policies as they see
fit, the actions of the state attorneys general for an institution’s breach of
its own privacy policy under the aegis of unfair trade practices laws may
have the practical effect of causing the institution to water down the
privacy policies they publish in order to avoid any risk of liability for
noncompliance under the FTC Act. Thus, unless the FTC changes its
current policy to include a watchdog role for patently unfair privacy
policies, the FTC Act is likely to provide protection for information
privacy only in very limited situations.377
However, if a tort privacy claim is deemed to exist for intrusive
profiling activities, the analysis changes radically. As discussed above,
Code, courts may not impose their own notions of what is unfair, and legislation may
limit the judiciary’s power to determine certain conduct as unfair).
373. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000).
374. Id.
375. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 506
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting a letter from the Federal Trade Commission to DoubleClick’s
outside counsel concerning DoubleClick’s collection of clickstream data: “Based on this
investigation, it appears to staff that DoubleClick never used or disclosed consumers’
[personally indentifiable information] for purposes other than those disclosed in its
privacy policy.”) (emphasis added); see also Sovern, supra note 111, at 1322 (stating that
the deceptive trade practices under the FTC Act are invoked only with respect to
affirmative misrepresentations made with respect to the collection of information and
occasionally when information is collected from children online).
376. The FTC does, however, articulate a suggested formulation for fair information
practices, including notice, choice, access, and security. FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 12.
377. The author favors an FTC definition of “patently unfair” including any privacy
policy that either fails to mention the existence of profiling activities or allows any
profiling of consumers’ data without their prior express written consent.
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the current weakness in many consumer protection statutes aimed at
information privacy issues is the fact that the publication of a privacy
policy often negates the critical element of deception necessary to
establish the cause of action. However, if a privacy tort cause of action
is recognized, and intrusive profiling is therefore deemed tortious, it
would enable the use of the unlawful branch of federal and state
consumer protection statutes.378 In addition, recent FTC statements
indicate that a plaintiff showing a “tangible misappropriation of
personal protected information” could establish a “substantial injury”
and thus show a violation of the “unfair” branch of the FTC Act.379
A consumer would therefore have ample opportunities for redress under
the state consumer protection laws, often called the “Little FTC Acts.”
First, a state attorney general can bring action on behalf of the state. Next,
most states provide a consumer with a private right of action to bring suit.
And not only would the plaintiff be availed of tort damages, but the
statutes usually provide statutory damages for a consumer who is
successful in litigating a claim, including punitive damages, a minimum
statutory amount, and often recovery of attorney fees.380
VI. CONCLUSION
Consumer profiling is becoming a common practice by banks,
brokerages, and insurance companies due to improvements in technology,
increasing competitive pressures in the industry, and the changing
legislative and regulatory parameters for the financial services sector.
Legislative measures to protect consumers’ financial privacy, such as the
GLBA, have failed to include any protections against consumer
profiling, and such protections are unlikely to be introduced by
legislation in the near future because of the very powerful industry
378. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 2001) (includes any
unlawful act or practice); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 229, 234 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the Business and Professions Code
“borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices); Saunders v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that unlawful
practices under the Act may be court made).
379. Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, in FTC v.
ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 0023046 (emphasis added), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000
/01/reversemt.htm (last visited May 27, 2002). The case eventually ended in a consent
agreement. FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 00 0032, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20761
(D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2000). See also, Sovern, supra note 111, at 1343–48 (discussing the
potential ramifications of the ReverseAuction.com case).
380. See Sovern, supra note 111, at 1350–51.
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lobbies that tend to militate against any divestment of the industry’s
current entitlement to a consumer’s transaction data.
The courts’ recognition of the applicability of either the common law
intrusion on seclusion or the appropriation privacy torts to the practice of
consumer profiling would set a tort liability rule in motion that would
require a consumer’s express opt-in consent before his or her personal
financial information was disclosed or otherwise used for profiling
purposes outside the scope of the consumer’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. For any breach of this privacy right, state and federal consumer
protection laws could be leveraged to provide a private right of action
that would enable consumers to recover statutory minimum damages for
any breach of their privacy rights.
America’s core values of equality, autonomy, and human dignity may
be diminished if the use of profiling technology is embraced by the
financial services industry and if society acquiesces to this practice
without the concurrent adoption of equivalent legal protections against
its abuses. The common law privacy tort provides a flexible and
workable mechanism by which individuals might control the use of their
personal information profile, without precluding socially beneficial or
necessary uses of that information in the process. But unless this right is
soon given formal recognition by the courts, information privacy rights
in personal financial information remain tenuous at best.
The right is fundamental and rooted in antiquity. The remedy is
within reach. The words of Warren and Brandeis are as applicable now
as when they were first written: “[T]he protection of society must come
mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual. . . . It is
believed that the common law provides . . . [a weapon] forged in the
slow fire of the centuries, and to-day fitly tempered to [the] hand.”381
JANET DEAN GERTZ

381.

1018

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 219–20.

